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No. 12, December 1980

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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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**USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY**  
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## THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: CURRENT ASPECTS

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[Article by G. N. Tsagolov]

[Text] In 1976, at the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev made the following remark: "The generally positive development of Soviet-American relations in recent years has been complicated by a number of important factors. Influential forces in the United States, interested neither in the improvement of relations with the USSR nor in international detente as a whole, have tried to impede this development."<sup>1</sup> The events of recent years have confirmed the accuracy of this statement. The more reactionary circles in the United States have launched a savage counteroffensive against detente. As a result, the positive development of American-Soviet relations ceased at the turn of the decade, and militaristic and interventionist tendencies became more pronounced in U.S. foreign policy.

The central position in the camp of detente's enemies is occupied by the powerful bloc of forces commonly called the military-industrial complex (MIC).

The current situation lends particularly urgency to the need for continued research into this source of military danger and generator of the arms race. The author of this article naturally will not even attempt to make a thorough investigation of a subject as complex and multifaceted as this one; particularly since certain aspects of the matter have already been examined in our literature.<sup>2</sup> It does seem, however, that the place occupied by the MIC in the system of American imperialism and the degree and limits of its influence now deserve particularly close scrutiny and constant thorough investigation. In turn, this calls for the clarification of the composition of the MIC and the structure of its nucleus, as well as precise distinction between the Marxist and bourgeois interpretations of the MIC as a specific social phenomenon. The article will focus on these aspects. In addition, after examining the views of various researchers, the author felt the need to repeat several well-known facts.

### I

The bourgeois press is not stingy with its analyses of the MIC. In the last decade and a half, many prominent American analysts and statesmen have stated their views on this matter. Most of the studies of the MIC were published in the late 1960's and early 1970's, in connection with the anti-war movement and mood of that time, which achieved proportions unprecedented in the United States.



In American scientific literature of the 1970's, criticism of the MIC was developed in the works of such prominent bourgeois economists and political scientists as J. Galbraith, S. Melman, R. Barnett and G. Kennan.<sup>3</sup> Their works have continuously reflected the concern of the sober-minded segment of the ruling class that the activities of the MIC could start the fire of a third world (thermonuclear) war. Another tendency has been apparent, however, in American literature on the whole. The depiction of the "military establishment" that is gaining more ground now is one in which the authors (for example, M. Weidenbaum, A. Yarmolinsky and J. Fox) are guided less by the interests of peace than by a desire to enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. military machine and free it from "bureaucratic encumbrances."

Many American studies of the MIC have noted something the Marxists pointed out long ago. For example, the thesis regarding the monopolization of military production by a handful of concerns, feverishly swelling the military budget for the sake of cold cash, is now discussed even in books by bourgeois ideologists. The cobweb of personal ties connecting the monopolistic military-industrial corporations with defense agencies is also being openly discussed.

When it comes to the factors contributing to the development of the MIC and its essence, however, the bourgeois and Marxist approaches differ fundamentally. Regardless of the basic premises of bourgeois critics of the MIC, their class outlook almost always limits their comprehension of its true nature and causes them to skim the surface of events and, sometimes, even to slide into the camp of its apologists.

The most popular variations of the bourgeois interpretation of the MIC can be judged merely from the following typical ways in which the MIC has been defined by American authors: "a conglomerate elite--military, industrial, banking, labor and academic--which is striving to increase its own power and wealth by means of global expansion"; "an informal and variable coalition of groups with psychological, moral and financial incentives to constantly develop and maintain a high level of arms production, preserve colonial markets and solve internal problems by military means."<sup>4</sup>

Definitions of this kind are intended to somehow transfer the responsibility for the dangerous activities of the MIC to broad segments of the American public by depicting the complex as a natural attribute of any society at any time. These vague phrases and abstract approach tend to expunge the MIC of its chief characteristic--its class, social content. They eradicate the distinctions between the forces representing the basic components of the complex and the instruments used by the complex to accomplish its predominance.

The theories of European bourgeois researchers are just as eclectic and amorphous.

A special place in the literature pertaining to the MIC is occupied by the West's major theoretician and economist of the present day, J. Galbraith. This original critic of the more abnormal facets of capitalist society published a book entitled "How To Stop the Military" as early as 1969, in which he tried to expose the roots of American militarism and the MIC with a vehemence uncharacteristic of the bourgeois ideologist. He examines the same issues in detail in his well-known works

"The New Industrial State," "Economics and the Public Purpose" and his latest lengthy study "The Age of Uncertainty."<sup>5</sup> Galbraith must be given credit as the denouncer of American reaction and the military establishment, as an active member and ideologist of the antimilitaristic movement in the United States and as an advocate of peaceful coexistence by the two systems and the positive development of American-Soviet relations. Nonetheless, we cannot agree with some of the premises of his view of the MIC.

The cornerstone of Galbraith's theoretical constructions in regard to the MIC is the thesis of the need of the "industrial system" (that is, the world of the big monopolistic corporations--G. Ts.) for constant growth. Arms production, he believes, is a field in which corporations can acquire large allocations with the least difficulty and in which the production itself is almost unconnected with risks. The companies that have embarked on this course do not wish to give up the benefits of the military business. This is the reason for the strong pressure they exert for the purpose of guaranteeing the continuation of the arms race. Moreover, the development of the technological revolution has compounded the "industrial system's need for growth."

Another important factor contributing to the development of the MIC, in Galbraith's opinion, is the bureaucratic tendencies which are gaining headway in private and state organizations. The common goals of private and state bureaucracies result in their mutual support and "bureaucratic symbiosis."<sup>6</sup> Although these "bureaucratic tendencies" are definitely progressing, the entire essence of the matter cannot be reduced simply to this. After all, in addition to the leaders of the military establishment, the state bureaucracy connected with arms purchases and the top administrators (the "technostructure") of companies, the MIC also consists of the main stockholders--the owners of military-industrial concerns. It is these individuals, and not their hired managers, who ultimately control the affairs of the monopolistic corporations producing weapons. Attempts to cover all military-industrial magnates with the abstract mantle of "bureaucrats" distort, at the very least, and impoverish the image of the governing nucleus of the MIC.

Galbraith's discussion of the "imperatives of technological progress," just as the views of several other authors, is largely groundless. The technological revolution does not give rise to the problem of the military-industrial complex in itself, but simply gives the problem an extremely urgent and burning nature.

Bourgeois ideologists, even those as liberal as Galbraith, are incapable of explaining the MIC scientifically. The class limitations, the disregard for historical factors, the social-institutional approach and the technological determinism lying at the basis of their theoretical reasoning prevent them from analyzing the problem in depth and in full.

## II

Let us briefly consider that Marxist-Leninist science regards the MIC as a natural product of the development of contemporary capitalism. The general basis of the MIC was laid by the rapid growth of productive forces and the progressive collectivization of capitalist production, and it took shape as a direct result, and at the juncture, of the state-monopolistic and militaristic processes inherent in imperialism.

The term "military-industrial complex" cannot be found in the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. But the essence of this phenomenon was revealed by V. I. Lenin. As part of his examination of the economic content of imperialism and his demonstration of the direct relationship between militarism and the expansionist nature of the monopolies taking the place of free competition, in several works Lenin stressed the special role played in the circumstances leading up to and culminating in World War I by the alliances of cannon, shipbuilding, dynamite and other trusts and syndicates with top-level military and political figures.<sup>7</sup>

Lenin illustrated the incendiary role of these alliances primarily with incidents from English and German history. After World War II, the chief center for the development of the MIC moved to the United States, which took on the functions of a leader of the imperialist bloc and made hegemonistic claims to world leadership "from a position of strength." The activities of the American MIC took on gigantic proportions and a clearly defined anti-Soviet character, and anticommunism and the myth of the "Soviet military threat" became its main standards. The approach of the nuclear age made the problem of the MIC an issue of primary significance.

The study of the MIC was further developed and reflected in the documents of the CPSU and world communist movement. It was noted that the "military-industrial complex has become the striking force of imperialism, stimulating reaction in the domestic and foreign policy of bourgeois states."<sup>8</sup> Describing the nature of the MIC, the Communist Party, USA, underscored in its program that this complex represents the "most sinister offspring" of state-monopoly capitalism and "a combination of the particular sectors of monopolistic companies which have the greatest incentive to encourage the spirit of militarism and the greatest interest in military ventures abroad, and top military leaders."<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, Marxists believe that the essence of the MIC problem stems from the development of specific types of military-state-monopoly relations, alliances, structures and groups within the framework of contemporary capitalism. They are not saying that the MIC is solely to blame for militarism and the arms race. Imperialism gives rise to militarism and, under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism, the latter has led to the formation of an arch-reactionary, aggressive alliance between the monopolistic nucleus of the military business and the militaristic and pro-militaristic upper echelon of government. As the MIC grows, it becomes an independent force, capable of providing strong supplementary impetus for the intensification of militarism and the arms race and this "supplement" could be the very drop that will overflow the cup of tension created in the world by the presence of nuclear weapons.

The latest aspects of the development of the MIC have confronted researchers with several important and complex issues. Let us first consider the question of the composition of the MIC.

The American military business is now connected with or related to the majority of economic sectors. It is not only the aerospace, radioelectronic, shipbuilding and chemical industries that are participating to some degree, directly or indirectly, in Pentagon purchases, but also the glass, timepiece, clothing and food industries. It would be easier to list the monopolistic corporations which do not receive military contracts than to list those that do. Servicemen are supplied not only



by Rockwell International, but even Pepsi-Cola, for example. It is not only monopolies, but also thousands of medium-sized and small firms, that have been drawn into the orbit of military production. All of these facts might suggest at first that all of American monopolistic capitalism is now tinged with a militaristic hue, that all of it has become part of the MIC. But this kind of broad interpretation of the MIC, which would equate it with monopolistic capitalism would be incorrect.

More than 20,000 companies and establishments in the United States are now serving military agencies as primary contractors. The lion's share of military production, however, is concentrated within the hands of a small number of corporations. In cost terms, around 70 percent of all Pentagon contracts are obtained by only a hundred firms and organizations.<sup>10</sup>

In order to clarify the composition of the private monopolistic sector of the MIC and the alignment of forces within it, it would be expedient to consider not only the parameters of the military contracts obtained by companies, but also the nature of the products delivered to military departments, the place occupied by each firm in the monopolistic structure of the branch and the proportion accounted for by military business in the company's total production volume.

From this standpoint, let us compare two of the firms making up the Pentagon's largest 100 contractors--General Dynamics and Gulf Oil. In fiscal year 1978, the General Dynamics firm, the Pentagon's largest contractor, obtained military contracts totaling 4.2 billion dollars. More than two-thirds of its total sales volume in recent years has been accounted for by combat equipment--F-16 bombers, the Trident system, the Tomahawk cruise missile and others. This firm is one of the monopolies controlling the major branches of the defense industry, such as the aerospace and shipbuilding branches. Contacts with the Pentagon are extremely important to this firm. It is indicative that more than 100 former high-level Pentagon employees have been on its staff for a long time.<sup>11</sup>

Gulf Oil is a different matter. In terms of the cost of military contracts (80 million dollars in fiscal year 1978), the firm holds 87th place. What is more, Pentagon purchases account for less than 1 percent of its total sales volume, and it does not produce weapons, but petroleum products which are also used for peaceful purposes. For this monopoly, which focuses almost totally on the civilian market, contacts with the Pentagon are of little significance, and there are no retired generals or admirals on the Gulf Oil staff.<sup>12</sup>

General Dynamics and Gulf Oil represent the two extremes among the Pentagon's 100 main contractors. A position somewhere in the middle is occupied by, for example, Texas Instruments. Although this is one of the military establishment's main suppliers of electronic equipment, more than 80 percent of the corporation's total output was used for civilian purposes in the 1970's. The military market is also of considerable significance to this firm, however. Seven former high-level military officials work for the concern.<sup>13</sup>

Therefore, the category of major military contractor can conditionally be divided into three groups. The first group consists of around 30 companies in addition to General Dynamics, including Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Grumman, Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, Fairchild Industries, Sanders Associates and Chamberlain Manufacturing;



the second group consists of approximately 40 firms in addition to Texas Instruments, including General Electric, Chrysler, Westinghouse Electric, Teledyne and Hewlett-Packard; the third, in addition to Gulf Oil, consists of around 15 firms, including Exxon, Standard Oil of California and Mobil Oil.<sup>14</sup>

This system of classification simplifies the determination of the composition and structure of the MIC. It has become more or less apparent that the companies in the first group are part of the complex, and that the companies in the third group are not part of it (four petroleum corporations in this last group are not even American: British Petroleum, Petroleos Mexicanos, Royal Dutch/Shell and AGIP). The military departments of the companies in the second group are also components of the MIC. What is more, in the struggle for military contracts, these departments use the influence of the entire company, and the prevalence of civilian production in the activities of these companies does not in any sense signify that they will not do everything within their power to maximize these contracts. For the Chrysler firm, for example, the multibillion-dollar contract for the XM-1 tanks now not only guarantees strong government support, but could possibly even serve as a sheet-anchor to protect the firm from the kind of misfortunes it has recently suffered.<sup>15</sup>

But what about the small firms specializing in the provision of companies like General Dynamics with some kind of secondary parts? Are they part of the MIC? It would seem that they are not. The MIC consists of monopolistic and state-monopolistic elements. These small subcontractors, which are outsiders in the defense industry, are most likely only allies of the MIC.

In any description of the private sector of the MIC, it is important to note the relative stability of its composition. When we compare the lists of the 100 main military contractors in 1970 and 1979, we can see that 65 of the names are on both lists. Moreover, the lowest rate of turnover is found among major contractors. Only 3 of the "top" 45 firms in the 1970 list are absent from the 1979 list. The highest rate of turnover is characteristic of suppliers of products used for civilian purposes as well, and not of arms suppliers--that is, not of the corporations making up the MIC. The most stable part of the MIC is its very core: In the last 20 years, for example, Lockheed, United Technologies, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics and General Electric have constantly been among the 10 largest recipients of Pentagon contracts.

Although the corporations of the MIC often turn over around half of their orders to other firms and the number of subcontractors involved in filling orders sometimes reaches several thousand, this does not in any way signify a sizeable reduction in the degree of the concentration and monopolization of the defense business. The fact is that the largest primary military contractors also acquire most (in cost terms) of the subcontracted orders. When the competition for the initial order has come to an end and the victor has been named, part of the work is generally turned over to rival firms, either directly or on a subcontracted basis. In spring 1980, for example, Boeing came out ahead of General Dynamics in a fierce struggle for a 4-billion-dollar order for air-based cruise missiles. The Pentagon does plan, however, to involve General Dynamics in the manufacture of a certain percentage of the missiles based on Boeing's design. Boeing's top 20 subcontractors include its rivals in the aerospace industry, such as the United Technologies and Northrop firms.<sup>16</sup> Progress in military technology has made this kind of cooperation common,

and this is largely due to increasing specialization in the production of individual components of weapon systems. This cooperation, however, mainly leads only to the division of the military contract pie among the private monopolistic elite of the MIC. It is also promoting the further consolidation and coordination of MIC forces.

Therefore, although the MIC "empire" does not have precisely defined boundaries and does not exist in pure form, just as there is no "pure" form of imperialism or of many other social phenomena, its private monopolistic nucleus is quite clearly defined. This consists of the Pentagon's 70-80 largest contractors producing various weapon systems or their major components.

The state links of the MIC are personified primarily by generals and admirals who are the chiefs of staff of individual branches of the armed services. Most of the present top-ranking career servicemen of this group participated directly in the U.S. wars in Korea or Vietnam. The need for specific types of weapons is determined, in particular, by the chiefs of staff and their deputies and assistants.

This group also includes the "civilian" heads of the military establishment--the secretaries of defense, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and their deputies and assistants. In the United States these officials are appointed by the President and are not from the military. Ideally, this should presuppose civilian control over military leaders and should protect the nation from excessive influence on the part of the military establishment. In fact, however, these civilian heads generally act in concert with the top echelon of the military, and civilian control over the military departments became a fiction long ago. Both bureaucratic factions in the Pentagon are closely interrelated with the top substratum of military-industrial corporations.

These corporations, which have merged with government military establishments, make up a single military-state-monopolistic group pursuing selfish goals and creating or finding numerous allies and followers. High-level figures in politics and government are quite prominent among these. Another "valuable" ally is the corrupt segment of Congress, particularly the members of the appropriations and armed services committees of both houses, such as Washington Democrat W. Magnuson, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and H. Jackson, who are called the "senators from Boeing"; J. Tower, a Republican from Texas who defends the interests of General Dynamics in the Senate; H. Cannon, Democratic senator from Nevada who is actively supporting the multibillion-dollar MX program; and L. McDonald, Democratic senator from Georgia, a member of the ultra-rightist John Birch Society and defender of the interests of Lockheed, which has large aerospace enterprises in his district.

These and other proteges of military concerns use all means at their disposal to fuel militaristic and chauvinistic passions. They often have an opportunity to actively influence the general atmosphere in the Congress, which has recently not only filled all of the Pentagon's orders but has also initiated the escalation of military spending.

The MIC is also associated with such federal agencies as the Department of Energy, which focuses at least half of its efforts on military objectives, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The CIA and some subdivisions of the State

Department are also extremely close to this group. By offering research grants to select universities and establishing its own research centers, the MIC directly influences the intellectual spheres of public life and has drawn a fairly large group of scientific personnel into the militaristic orbit. Many cultural establishments and elements of the mass media are also funded by the MIC.

### III

The military-state-monopolistic nucleus of the MIC, its evolution and its structure are certainly of particular interest. Scientific literature on these matters includes opinions shared by the overwhelming majority of authors and certain debatable views and unresolved arguments.

The opinion that the MIC nucleus primarily includes monopolistic corporations specializing mainly in military production, such as General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, Hughes Aircraft, Northrop and Lockheed, is not disputed by anyone. Besides this, proceeding from the fact that military-industrial concerns are controlled by various segments of the financial oligarchy, some researchers have concluded that the MIC is only an organic part of the total financial-monopolistic establishment, and not any kind of independent force, and that the term "military-industrial complex" came about as the result of the purely speculative association of heterogeneous and largely unrelated elements within a single set of quotation marks.<sup>17</sup> This conclusion does not seem completely sound.

Above all, the degree of control exercised by Wall Street and other financial centers over military concerns should not be absolutized: Each monopoly in a particular financial group is independent to some extent. This independence is not diminished when financial groups evolve from family groups into coalitions or regional groups.<sup>18</sup> Besides this, is it not possible that the "raw material"--concerns and trusts--combines with government agencies to form another monopolistic structure which differs from established financial groups but is closely connected with them and includes some of their elements?

It is a fact that Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon) always was and still is the foundation of the Rockefeller financial group. In addition to this, it was once one of the "seven sisters" making up another monopolistic association--the international oil cartel. In precisely the same way, the association of military concerns with different groups of financiers does not exclude the possibility of a community of interests, reinforced by the extremely close ties they all have with the Pentagon and with some other government establishments, and this provides sufficient grounds to prove that the MIC is a new structural form that has developed within the imperialist framework.

As for the fact that military concerns belong to various financial-oligarchic groups, this proves only that certain conflicts, differing interests and friction exist within the MIC. An equally heated competitive struggle is also going on in the state sector of the MIC. Each military agency is trying to defeat the others in the race for defense contracts. What is more, the upper echelon on the military departments uses certain groups in the leadership of the bourgeois parties and representatives of big business in its own interest.



We must not ignore the fact, however, that the conflicts within the MIC have only a fraction of the strength of the mutual attraction of MIC components--an attraction born of the common positions, goals and interests of various links. The top strata of the military departments and armed forces, just as the military-industrial corporations, have a common desire to escalate the arms race, because more sizeable military programs produce more sizeable profits for the concerns and more sizeable rewards for the military-state bureaucracy connected with the compilation and execution of the programs. Naturally, the more "generously" representatives of purchasing bodies behave toward contractors, the more "gratitude" they receive in return. It would be a mistake to stress only the differences between MIC components and lose sight of their common features.

The MIC is not a hypothetical association of diverse elements, but a real functioning system which arose as a result of the merger of some monopolies and the financial oligarchy with the state--a system uniting interrelated elements in a single entity on the basis of state-monopoly relations. As a form of an even higher order than cartels, syndicates, trusts, concerns and even financial groups, a form which organically includes not only private monopolistic associations but even some major government institutions, the MIC clearly reflects the general tendency toward capitalism's continued transformation into a state-monopolistic entity. We should not overestimate the degree to which this state-monopolistic "subsystem" is "amorphous," even though the MIC certainly is not a fully formed organization with a precise structure, system of administration and program of action.

It is not surprising that particularly strong ties between corporations and the state have been established precisely in the militaristic sphere. To a considerable extent, the militaristic state-monopoly alliance is also reinforced by the increasing personal unity of military-industrial concerns and the leadership of military agencies and the armed forces.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps the strongest contributing factor, however, is the revolution in military technology, its sharply increased complexity and rising cost and the changes in the armament purchasing system.<sup>20</sup> It is in this sphere that the disruption of commercial production is most pronounced. It is here that the particularly intensive growth of elements of state-monopoly planning is witnessed. Traditional contacts through market channels are being replaced by the constant coordination of the plans of producers and consumers, and even their merger into a single complex.

The government is cooperating more and more closely with military-industrial corporations. Tens of thousands of Pentagon employees are involved to some degree in the implementation of all programs in the defense industry. The state is financing most of the research and engineering operations of military concerns and is providing them, without charge, with the research findings of its own research organizations. It is extending them credit on preferential terms and providing them with fixed and working capital on a broad scale.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time, corporations are playing an increasingly important role in determining the government's need for weapons. "As for military equipment," J. Galbraith points out, "the /initial decision is made by the firm producing the weapons/ [in boldface] and the command of the branch of the service" to whom the particular weapons are being offered<sup>22</sup> (emphasis mine--G. Ts.). Representatives of corporations constantly consult with the leaders of military agencies and the armed forces regarding the choice of particular weapon systems. This is done within



the framework of several state-monopoly organizations in the MIC system which are officially expected to encourage the coordination of the defense industry with government departments.

Military-industrial corporations have a much higher profit norm than other companies. An analysis of 146 defense contracts conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office revealed an average profit norm of 56 percent on the capital invested by these concerns.<sup>23</sup> The same indicator for the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States at the end of the 1970's was 14 percent.

What is more, MIC corporations have unique opportunities to derive hidden superprofits. The prices of weapons, as mentioned above, are generally set by means of direct negotiations, and although these do not completely exclude the possibility of competition, they make defense contracts inaccessible to the majority of other links of private capital. The high degree of monopolization in the military branches of industry is supplemented by the existence of a single client--the government. In connection with this, the monopoly here has all the features of a "two-way monopoly," according to the terminology of American authors.<sup>24</sup> The higher the estimated cost of the program, the greater the rewards. For this reason, companies make every effort to exaggerate production costs. Camouflaged by various expenditure items, these hidden superprofits can grow to tremendous proportions.

#### IV

What place does the MIC occupy in the system of American imperialism? What are the degrees and limits of its influence?

When Western ideologists discuss these matters, they often proceed from the proportion accounted for by military expenditures in the gross national product. In the last 10 years this indicator fluctuated from 5 to 8 percent, and the proportion accounted for by military production in the GNP is even lower, because military expenditures also include the maintenance of the armed forces. This leads to the conclusion that the influence of the MIC is negligible.

Let us first point out that it is a mistake to completely disregard the political aspect of the matter, which plays an exceptionally important role, and the militaristic functions of the MIC, which give it a special place in the social system. The influence of the MIC is considerably strengthened by the fact that intense military preparations are largely consistent with the general strategic interests of the American imperialist bourgeoisie, while the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and the objective deterioration of capitalist positions in the world arena are more frequently motivating the financial oligarchy to rely on militarism and military strength.

Another important consideration is the solid weight of the MIC within the state-monopoly system. As we know, the redistribution of national income through the federal budget is among the most highly developed forms of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States. Around 45 percent of national income is annually recirculated in this way. Military needs absorb approximately one-fourth of all federal expenditures. This means that the MIC accounts for quite excessive proportions of national income and the federal budget and, consequently, manipulates them in its own interest. The MIC controls a particularly large share of the

federal contract system for the purchase of goods and services, which holds a position at the very center of American state-monopoly capitalism. Military departments account for more than two-thirds of all federal government purchases. Another important consideration is the property they own. Of all government (and even non-government) establishments, the Pentagon is the largest property owner in the nation. Its property (valued at over 270 billion dollars at the end of the 1970's) constitutes more than half of all U.S. federal property.<sup>25</sup>

The position and influence of the MIC have been considerably reinforced by its "built-in" status in monopolistic capital's mechanism of domination. Although the composition and the structure of the MIC, as we have pointed out, do not coincide with the composition and structure of monopolistic capital and its financial oligarchy, there has been a tendency toward an increase in their number of common links. If we compare the lists of the 100 largest industrial corporations in the United States and the 100 largest military contractors, we will find 42 companies on both lists. In the past there were less of these companies. If we compare the lists of the 60 richest Americans (the nucleus of the financial oligarchy) and the 60 most prominent representatives of the MIC, we will find around 15 names on both lists (H. Crown, D. Packard, J. McDonnell and others).

The relationship between the MIC and the financial oligarchy can also be illustrated through the example of the Rockefellers, who now control capital valued at more than 100 billion dollars in dozens of different economic spheres. Is this family involved in weapons production? Yes. The Martin-Marietta firm--the chief contracting organization in the production of MX missiles and medium-range Pershing 2 missiles--is flourishing under its patronage. Laurance Rockefeller owns a large share of the stock in the McDonnell-Douglas concern and several other military-industrial enterprises. The interests of the Rockefellers are much broader than those of the MIC, however, although some links of their financial-oligarchic group are part of this complex or associated with it.

The unity and extremely close interaction of the MIC and the financial oligarchy constitute another factor contributing to the influence of the complex, far exceeding the proportion accounted for by military production in the GNP: The MIC is using all of its diverse ties in the monopolistic sphere to carry out its own plans and attain its own goals. What is more, whereas investments in the military business represent only one investment sphere, and not even the main one, to the Rockefellers, Morgans, du Ponts and Mellons, investments of this kind represent the main source of profit, or at least one of the main sources, to a considerable segment of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. This is particularly true of magnates from the southwest, such as, for example, Fairchild, Douglas, Packard, Brown, Gross, Johnson and Sanders.

Finally, the growth of the MIC's influence has accompanied the augmentation of the military-state bureaucracy's role--an objective tendency in the development of imperialism and state-monopoly capitalism, and one which has been particularly pronounced during the period since World War II. Recently, FORTUNE magazine contained an article about one of its typical representatives--W. Perry, chief of defense research and engineering in the Carter Administration. He heads a staff of 350 individuals responsible for arms purchase policymaking and supervising the execution of 1,500 military-production-scientific programs. In addition, he is in charge of all exports of military technology. He also oversees the coordination

of the military research and development projects of the United States and NATO. Prior to his appointment to this office, which is one of the key positions in the Pentagon hierarchy, Perry was known as the founder and owner of Electromagnetic Systems Laboratories, a California military-electronics firm with over a thousand blue- and white-collar employees. Soon after Perry's move to Washington, the value of the firm's stock rose 235 percent.<sup>26</sup>

Since the mid-1970's, the old reactionary political organizations serving the MIC, particularly the notorious Committee on the Present Danger, have been reorganized and some new ones have been established. There has also been a noticeable increase in the number of so-called "political action committees"--the lobbying organizations of specific military concerns which solicit contributions with the slogan "Either go into politics or get out of business."<sup>27</sup>

From the very beginning, the Carter Administration made deep curtsies to the MIC. As early as 1978, NATION magazine noted that the Carter Administration "is inclined to follow the same line of reasoning that led to Vietnam" and that "Carter is rapidly becoming the most dangerous president in the entire history of the United States."<sup>28</sup> Since the end of 1979 the White House has been even more consistent in conducting a militaristic line. One of the clearest signs of this line is the recent adoption of the "new nuclear strategy."

Naturally, it would be wrong to say that the U.S. administration is a puppet of the military-industrial complex. It is controlled by a much broader coalition of the American bourgeoisie, in which the MIC represents only a single component. Washington policy takes shape under the influence of the MIC and of a considerably more complex parallelogram of forces. It would be difficult to determine, for instance, the exact degree to which the present militaristic fever in the United States has been dictated by the private and specific interests of the MIC or by general imperialist considerations, particularly since the vectors of these forces largely coincide. The facts testify, however, that the interests of the MIC are fully recognized by those who have made and executed U.S. policy in recent years.

The military budget of the United States in the current (1981) fiscal year has achieved dimensions of unprecedented scales (171.5 billion dollars). In just 1 year, it rose approximately 20 billion dollars. This growth is connected with the intensification of the arms race and with the mass production of the latest weapon models. In recent months, the American press has paid particular attention to questions connected with the effectiveness of military production and has indulged in frequent cynical praise of all types of new combat equipment, especially the so-called "smart" missiles--that is, missiles with automatic precision tracking properties, Phantom aircraft and so forth. The 11 August 1980 issue of BUSINESS WEEK contained a detailed article entitled "The Pentagon's New Plans--Missiles, Missiles, Missiles." It is a thorough discussion of the militaristic excesses in the business world of the United States, citing numerous statements by MIC chiefs in support of the expanded development and purchase of an entire series of weapon systems "corresponding to the current level of technical achievements." According to the magazine, "the need to purchase all of these systems in sufficient quantities is the main reason for the recent successful attempts by the Congress and the Pentagon to pressure President Carter for a sharp increase in defense appropriations in coming years."<sup>29</sup>



The natural course of world events in an era offering no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence adamantly demands the consolidation of peace. The restoration of the policy of confrontation and an unrestricted arms race will ultimately endanger both the financial oligarchy and the NIC bosses. The American general public is becoming increasingly aware of the connection between the intensification of domestic socioeconomic problems, which is so apparent under the conditions of the new economic crisis that began in February 1980, and the growth of military expenditures. The USSR and other peace-loving forces, whose influence on our planet has increased in recent years, are waging an energetic fight for the preservation and intensification of detente.

However, the fate of detente, unfortunately, does not depend only on these forces, but also on the governing elite in the West. We must remember that the imperatives of detente and the tendency toward it have not changed the basis of the capitalist order. This order, by virtue of its very nature and the entire objective course of development in the era of its general crisis, is still evolving, and not in any positive sense.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 21.
2. See, for example, the following monographs: B. D. Pyadyshev, "Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks SSHA" [The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex], Moscow, 1974; V. M. Mil'shteyn, "Voyenno-promyshlennyy kompleks i vneshnyaya politika SSHA" [The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Foreign Policy], Moscow, 1975; and the following articles: G. N. Tsagolov, "The Military-Industrial Complex: Some General Features" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1970), Ye. V. Bugrov, "The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 7, 1970), G. N. Tsagolov, "A Source of Heightened Risk" (KOMMUNIST, No 15, 1979), B. D. Pyadyshev, "The Military-Industrial Complex and U.S. Foreign Policy" (MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 1, 1980)—Editor's note.
3. See J. Galbraith, "Economics and the Public Purpose," Boston, 1973; Galbraith, "The Age of Uncertainty," London, 1977; R. Barnett, "The Giants. Russia and America," N.Y., 1977; S. Melman, "The Permanent War Economy. American Capitalism in Decline," N.Y., 1974; G. Kennan, "The Cloud of Danger. Current Realities of American Foreign Policy," Boston-Toronto, 1977.
4. S. Lens, "The Military-Industrial Complex," Philadelphia, 1970, p 145; "War, Business and American Society. Historical Perspectives on the Military-Industrial Complex," edited by B. Cooling, N.Y., 1977, p 4.
5. J. Galbraith, "The Age of Uncertainty," pp 227-257.
6. "Bureaucratic symbiosis," Galbraith writes, "reaches its highest point of development in the relations between military firms and the Department of Defense with its subdivisions.... The development of a new generation of planes and their acquisition also reward the government bureaucracy connected



with research and development, the conclusion of the agreement, the supervision of the contract's execution, operations and administration. The technostucture of a military firm represents the only source of employment for individuals who have ended their career in government. The top positions in the Department of Defense are mainly held by individuals recruited for the duration from top-level positions in the technostucture of military firms" ("Economics and the Public Purpose," p 143).

7. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, pp 175-176, 253-254 and elsewhere.
8. "Commemorating the Hundredth Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth," CPSU Central Committee Theses, Moscow, 1970, p 39.
9. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1970, p 83.
10. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 22 October 1979, pp 74, 75.
11. NEWSLETTER, 5 September 1979; A. Yarmolinsky, "The Military Establishment. Its Impacts on American Society," N.Y., 1971, p 61.
12. "Moody's Industrial Manual, 1979," p 1436; FORTUNE, May 1979, p 270.
13. FORTUNE, May 1979, p 270; A. Yarmolinsky, Op. cit., p 61.
14. Several companies are on the "border." The list of the 100 chief military contractors also includes two higher academic institutions (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Johns Hopkins University), which conduct a great deal of research and development for the Pentagon.
15. For more detail, see the article by N. A. Zakharov, "Chrysler Vicissitudes" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1980).
16. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 March 1980; NEWSWEEK, 4 February 1980, p 39.
17. See I. I. Beglov, "SShA: sobstvennost' i vlast'" [Property and Power in the United States], Moscow, 1971, pp 6-39.
18. For a more detailed discussion of current tendencies in the development of financial groups, see V. Zorin, "The Monopolies and Washington" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, Nos 7, 8, 1978).
19. A vivid example of the constant rotation of military men and businessmen between the Pentagon and the firms producing weapons was American General A. Haig's move at the end of 1979 from the office of NATO supreme allied commander in Europe to the office of the chairman of the board of United Technologies, an aerospace concern.
20. Prior to World War II, relations between private arms manufacturers and the war ministries were based on the principles of "open bids." Now 90 percent of all weapon purchases are made after negotiations within a "closed bid" system. In 1947 the Congress passed an act on military-industrial orders, in which the

principle of competitive bidding was declared the fundamental peacetime principle, but the law also listed 17 exceptions. As it turned out, the exceptions became the rule and the rule became the exception. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the U.S. contract system and its present form, see V. A. Fedorovich, "Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i gosudarstvennoye khozyaystvovaniye. Federal'naya kontraktnaya sistema: evolyutsiya, problemy, protivorechiya" [American Capitalism and Public Administration. The Federal Contract System: Evolution, Problems, Contradictions], Moscow, 1979.

21. For example, by the end of the 1970's, the corporations producing weapons and developing military technology already had state plants and equipment valued at around 15 billion dollars at their disposal. A study of the 40 largest concerns showed that government funds represented almost 55 percent of their total capital functioning within the sphere of military production. For a more detailed discussion, see G. M. Kuz'min, "Voyenno-promyshlennyye kontserny" [Military-Industrial Concerns], Moscow, 1974, pp 223, 227-228.
22. "Economics and the Public Purpose," p 142.
23. J. Fox, "Arming America. How the U.S. Buys Weapons," Boston, 1974, p 315.
24. A. Agapos, "Government-Industry and Defense: Economics and Administration," Alabama, 1975, p 61.
25. "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1979, p 371.
26. FORTUNE, 10 March 1980, p 60 et passim. Last fall W. Perry headed an American military-political delegation which visited China for the purpose of broadening American-Chinese contacts in the military sphere. He received his present office through the influence of H. Brown--Carter's secretary of defense. Brown himself was once on the IBM board of directors. Incidentally, he was secretary of the Navy in the Johnson Administration and advocated the bombing of North Vietnam at that time.
27. FINANCIAL TIMES, 24 October 1978.
28. NATION, 18 February 1978.
29. BUSINESS WEEK, 11 August 1980, p 81.

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## **VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 16-26**

**[Article by V. A. Vlasikhin and V. A. Linaik]**

**[Text]** One of the favorite offspring of American political-legal ideology is the doctrine of "legitimate government," according to which the United States is a society characterized by a "government of laws and not of men." According to the interpretation of American bourgeois ideologists, this formula signifies that whereas the "government of laws" presupposes justice based on a legal system, the "government of men," with all their flaws, weaknesses and political biases, could lead to abuses of power and the erosion of justice and the legal system.

During the preparations for the Madrid conference on security and cooperation in Europe and at the time of the conference itself, some Western politicians and propaganda centers tried to slander the socialist countries by alluding to certain "violations of human rights" in these countries. American propaganda has persistently tried to convince the world public that the United States is a model of democracy and precisely the kind of society in which "government of laws" exists and the rights of citizens are reliably protected. According to this propaganda, if traces of "government of men," distorting the ideals of legality and justice, should be seen, they should not be considered characteristic of American democracy.

Nonetheless, experience has demonstrated that numerous violations of legality and the abuse of authority precisely by those who are obligated to execute the laws and protect civil rights lie behind the widely publicized declarations of U.S. official circles to the effect that the rights of American citizens are reliably protected by law.

The U.S. Government, which aspires to the role of international guarantor of human rights, is extremely reluctant to discuss these violations and generally conceals them altogether. Many facts, however, have inevitably been made public and provide some idea of the actual degree to which constitutional rights and freedoms are suppressed in the United States.

### **I**

Freedom of speech, of religion and political beliefs, of the press and of assembly and the right to form political organizations are declared in the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and corresponding Supreme Court rulings.



Nonetheless, many Americans who try to exercise these rights and freedoms become the targets of government repression.

In recent years one of the characteristic features of U.S. ruling circles' punitive policy toward political opposition has been the use of "traditional" criminal laws against those who disagree with capitalist ways. Benjamin Chavis, the leader of the famous "Wilmington 10," made the following remark this April in an interview in France's DROIT ET LIBERTE magazine: "People are not accused of political offenses in our country. You are accused of some kind of criminal offense and are represented as a common criminal. It is worse to be a political prisoner in the United States than anywhere else. Even after your release, people always see you as a convicted criminal."<sup>1</sup>

In view of the fact that the authorities call any political activity that is legal but objectionable to them a crime, documented information about the scales of political persecution is almost impossible to find. The bourgeois press generally goes along with the authorities in representing political activists who have been apprehended as common criminals. An international group of lawyers, who visited the United States in 1979 and published a report on violations of human rights there, cited the following statistics.

The report stated that the category of political prisoner could include, in particular, the members of the "Wilmington 10" and the "Charlotte 3," Assata Shakur, Sundiata Akiolis, Imari Obadele and other defendants in the New African Republic case, David Rice, Ed Poindexter, Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt, Richard Marshall, Russell Means, Ted Means and others convicted in connection with the civil rights movement of the American Indians. The members of the international group also classified as political prisoners the activists fighting for Puerto Rican independence (L. Lebron, O. Collaso, I. Florez and R. Miranda), individuals who have arbitrarily been arrested, charged and convicted for racial reasons (J. Merritt, G. Mudd, G. Tyler and J. Rust) and individuals who, after they had already been convicted and imprisoned, were charged with new offenses and incarcerated under the harshest prison conditions because they defended the legitimate rights of prisoners. Examples of this category are the persons implicated in the cases of the Napanoch Brothers, the Raidsville Brothers, Johnny (Imani) Harris, Oscar (Gamba) Johnson, Ernest Graham, Albert Johnson, Ike Taylor, David McConnell and other Pontiac prison inmates.<sup>2</sup> The authors of the report particularly stressed that their list was far from complete.

When criminal proceedings are instituted against an "offender" who is a political activist, the prosecution sometimes hopes not only for a legal conviction--the rendering of a harsh sentence--but also a political conviction--the creation of a hostile atmosphere around the individual and of adverse public opinion regarding the "criminal."

By intimidating the political opposition in this way, the government can conserve its punitive potential and then use it full-strength against the most unwelcome individuals. As Professor J. Skolnick, an American attorney, pointed out: "During periods of intense political activity, the prosecuting authorities try to save the most severe punishments, as they are doing today, for those who pose the greatest threat to the system."<sup>3</sup> The material resources of punitive agencies can also be

used in the "shady" spheres of their activity--for example, the secret surveillance of dissidents. According to H. Silvergleit, "the authorities will watch, investigate, film, photograph and prosecute selected enemies of the republic, which will serve as a warning and an example to others."<sup>4</sup>

The freedom of speech and freedom of assembly declared in the first amendment to the constitution are regularly violated by the prosecutions of participants in mass protest demonstrations. In these cases, the authorities enforce state laws which define crimes in terms borrowed from common law--"inciting to riot," "refusal to disperse," "disorderly conduct," "obstructing traffic," "destroying property," "disturbing the peace" and others. These definitions, which are worded quite vaguely, allow the police to arbitrarily break up protest demonstrations and arrest participants in peace, black and youth rallies.

At the beginning of this year, for example, a court in Seattle sentenced a large group of citizens to prison. In October 1979 they had attended a peace rally in Bangor (Washington), where the chief Trident nuclear submarine base is located. The demonstrators were found guilty of the criminal "destruction of property." This kind of accusation is now the standard charge in the suppression of demonstrations near military facilities.

In July 1979 the police broke up a demonstration of 200 black Americans near the city council chambers in Philadelphia and arrested 20 of them on the charge that they were "disturbing the peace." The court was unable to find any element of crime in this case and had to acquit the persons who had been arrested.<sup>5</sup>

In the middle of last year, many civil rights demonstrations were held in various American cities to protest the recent increase in the brutal treatment and murder of Americans defending their own rights by policemen. Demonstrations took place in New York, Los Angeles, Hueytown (Alabama), Mendenhall (Mississippi), Philadelphia and Washington. During the New York demonstration on 9 June the renowned public spokesman A. Baraka was beaten by the police and arrested. In Los Angeles, members of the police force killed a black woman, Y. Love, and arranged for the surveillance of activists in the campaign to protest this crime.

In 1978 policemen in Philadelphia raided a house in which the black religious sect MOVE had gathered to pray. The beating of one sect member by three policemen was reported by a television newscaster.<sup>6</sup>

In the middle of last year the trial of 100 Chicanos began. These Mexican-Americans were charged with "assaulting officers of the law" on Labor Day in Pueblo's Veterans Auditorium (Colorado). The police burst into the hall and began to arrest the persons inside "for drunkenness." Not one white person was arrested.<sup>7</sup>

At the beginning of April this year, racial riots broke out in Wrightsville (Georgia). A peaceful demonstration by members of the city's black population was attacked by white racists, who were armed with metal bars and chains and started a bloody battle; 10 people were wounded and maimed. The local sheriff and his deputies organized and participated in this violence.

In July the police in Birmingham (Alabama) attacked and dispersed black picketers who were protesting the murder of a young black girl, B. Carter, by police in the

city's Kingston district. The police responsible for the killing were not even subjected to disciplinary action.

In Houston (Texas), the police arrested three participants in a protest demonstration against the murder of Mexican-American G. Torrez by police. Two of the men who were arrested and convicted (Travis Morales and Tom Hershey) are the heads of the People's League Against Police Brutality, and the third, Mara Youngdahl, is a member of a youth organization. This group of individuals, who had been protesting the Torrez killing, were called the "Moody Park 3." Their trial was conducted in an atmosphere of anticommunist hysteria. When the defendants were being examined, the district attorney announced that one of them--Tom Hershey--worked in a clinic for mentally retarded children so that he could "poison their minds and turn them into communists." The prosecution called one witness a communist just because she was wearing a red blouse. In accordance with Texas law, persons arrested in demonstrations can be prosecuted for all acts judged illegal even if these acts have been committed by other participants in the demonstration. It was precisely on these grounds that the "Moody Park 3" were prosecuted.

In Bedford-Stuyvesant, a Brooklyn neighborhood (in New York City), 2,000 people gathered on 22 August 1979 to protest the killing of Luis Banz, a young Puerto Rican, by policemen. The police beat up several demonstrators, ran into others with their police cars and arrested others.

Dozens dead and hundreds wounded--this is the result of the police repression ordered by the authorities against the black population of Miami in May and July of this year, when blacks demonstrated in defense of their rights. Reinforced teams of policemen combed the black neighborhoods, organized mass searches, subjected citizens with black skin to beatings and insults and threw hundreds of people behind bars. The news of the bloody violence against the black citizens of Miami circled the globe and aroused the indignation of the world public.

## II

In violation of the principle of "equal protection of the laws," established in the 14th amendment to the constitution, discrimination and breaches are still being practiced in the administration of the law in regard to the poor, blacks, Spanish-speaking Americans and Indians.

A report prepared in a House subcommittee noted: "If you are black, poor and unemployed and you are charged with robbery, you have a 90-percent chance of landing in jail; on the average your prison term will range from 74 to 124 months.... If you fall into the category of 'white-collar criminal,' if you live in the suburbs and if you steal millions instead of hundreds or thousands of dollars, you have only a 20-percent chance of going to jail, and the average prison term for you will not exceed 20 months."<sup>8</sup>

It is known, for example, that the United States is keeping more of its citizens in prison than any other capitalist state (with the exception of South Africa), and the main reason for this is racism. A recent study by the House Committee on the Judiciary contained the following statistics. In 1973 the average number of white prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants was 43.5, but the indicator for blacks was



367.5, or 8.5 times as high as the indicator for whites, and in 13 states the indicator was 10 times as high! What is more, we must remember that the black population in the United States represents one-eighth of the total population. The class nature of American corrective institutions is also indicated by the fact that approximately 90 percent of all prisoners in the United States in 1978 were poor.

In the middle of 1979 there were 522 persons in American jails who had been sentenced to death; three-fourths were in prisons in the nation's South; 42 percent of them were black and 4 percent were Spanish-speaking Americans. Blacks represented 51 percent of the officially recorded victims of police brutality and killings by police.<sup>9</sup> In U.S. history, 455 cases of the death penalty for rape have been documented; in 405 cases these were black Americans.

As noted in a report at the world conference in Switzerland for the eradication of racism and racial discrimination in May 1978, "not one white has been sentenced to death for murdering a black, although lynch courts have a long history, and the individual terrorizing of blacks by whites is still common practice today."<sup>10</sup>

According to the authors of a book about the Supreme Court of the United States, Thurgood Marshall, a member of this court, regarded capital punishment as "the most conspicuous example of the unfairness of the criminal justice system." He believed that it was "a penalty designed for poor minorities and the undereducated. The rich and well-educated were rarely sentenced to death. They hired fancy lawyers.... Marshall knew very well how the system worked. The death penalty was the ultimate form of racial discrimination."<sup>11</sup>

The American judicial system often forgets that Indians, the native inhabitants of America, are also entitled to "equal protection of the laws."

After the disturbances on the Red Lake Indian reservation (Minnesota), one inhabitant, Harry Hanson, was sentenced to 26 years in prison just for locking up four employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the reservation jail during the time of the disturbances (he did not harm them in any way). Hanson's lawyer indignantly said after the end of the week-long trial: "Twenty-six years for this? This is unheard of!"<sup>12</sup>

On 28 August 1979 the New York police surrounded an Indian reservation in Aquesasni, demanding the surrender of 20 individuals accused of "inciting to riot." In May of last year, the chief of the tribe prohibited a state establishment from felling lumber on reservation property. He was arrested for this, and this was the reason for the disturbances. Although the tribe contacted President Carter to protest the violation of Indian sovereignty, as stipulated in a 1794 agreement between the U.S. Government and six tribes, the state authorities are still laying siege to the reservation, demanding that the accused appear in court.

The American Indian Movement is now organizing a campaign to protest an unequivocal statement in President Carter's energy message regarding the government's intention to "eliminate all obstacles impeding the use of all natural resources located within the United States" in spite of the Indians' right, guaranteed by law, to manage their own land (80 percent of the nation's unexploited natural resources

can be found on Indian reservations). According to movement activists, the government will use the Bureau of Indian Affairs to remove these lands from the jurisdiction of Indian tribes, just as it has done more than once in the past.<sup>13</sup>

### III

The preparation of a new legislative base for the suppression of political opposition in violation of declared constitutional guarantees is another element of the repressive policy of U.S. ruling circles.

Despite the widely advertised investigations of the misuse of power by special services, which supposedly put an end to the traditional practice of restricting the constitutional rights of American citizens, the machinery of political surveillance, designed for the victimization of political activists and the eradication of political views displeasing the authorities, is still being perfected in the United States. The authors of the collective work "The Lawless State" were justified in warning that when the official investigation of the activities of the special services comes to an end, "the nation will be lulled with assurances that the mere cataloging of past offenses will solve the problem in the future. This is not so: Exposure and reform are two different things."<sup>14</sup>

The leading organ of political investigation--the Federal Bureau of Investigation--is still being strengthened. The government is now drafting a so-called FBI charter--a normative act regulating its activities.<sup>15</sup> The authorities had to resort to this kind of legal regulation of FBI activities after the scandalous revelations regarding illegal actions, particularly the publicity given to the "counterintelligence programs" (abbreviated "COINTELPRO") planned and conducted by the FBI under the supervision of then Director J. Edgar Hoover.

The basic content of the programs concerned subversive and provocative work by FBI agents within public organizations and against individuals who were in disfavor with the authorities but could not be prosecuted due to the absence of judicial grounds. The first of these programs was directed against the Communist Party, USA (this plan for subversive FBI work was compiled and put in action back in 1956). In the second half of the 1960's the FBI armed itself with programs directed against youth and black organizations. The programs were filled with provocative methods (or, as the Americans call them, "dirty tricks"). Espionage devices which were questionable from the legal standpoint or absolutely illegal were set in motion--electronic surveillance, wiretapping, infiltration, mail openings and secret property searches.

After the curtailment of COINTELPRO operations had been announced and the "dirty tricks" had been investigated, certain circles in the United States began to talk about a "new era" for the FBI, in which, according to them, there would be no room for "sinister excesses" and the secret war on political dissidents would come to an end.

But this did not happen: The present initiatives regarding the legal regulation of FBI authority are nothing other than a legal reinforcement of the bureau's old--and illegal--forms and methods of operation. Suffice it to say that the draft FBI charter authorizes bureau informants to infiltrate any organization and engage in "illegal nonviolent action" if the "value" of information obtained in this way

"outweighs" the gravity of the legal offense. The FBI is authorized, "under certain circumstances," to obtain information from physicians, attorneys, clergymen, psychiatrists and journalists, despite the "confidentiality" of this information, and to issue warrants for bank statements, tax records and information about telephone conversations.<sup>16</sup>

Whereas this kind of political espionage was considered illegal--officially, at least--in the past, now it has essentially been legalized. A report of the Senate committee investigating the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies contained an interesting remark in this connection: "Counterintelligence programs were actually being conducted as separate operations even before their official adoption as special programs. For this reason, and this is particularly important, operations of the COINTELPRO type could be going on even today, but under the heading of 'investigations.'"<sup>17</sup> A documentary on the espionage network was recently filmed in the United States by activists from the Campaign for Political Rights, in which numerous interviews with public spokesmen, clergymen and attorneys testified that activists in the movement for civil and political rights are still being investigated and discredited in the United States. The new objects of surveillance by intelligence agencies include the anti-nuclear movement and the American Indian Movement.<sup>18</sup>

In the last decade the new federal criminal code was redrafted several times. Rightist political forces in the United States tried to use the drafting of the new code in their own interest by working toward the inclusion of provisions authorizing more rigid criminal legal policy and arming the state with updated means of political repression. In particular, the version of the code introduced as bill S.1 in the Senate repeated the reactionary provisions of the 1940 Smith Act on the criminal liability of individuals implicated in antigovernmental activity. Under public pressure, this bill was redrafted and lost some of its anti-democratic provisions. Critics of the new version of the code (now bill S.1722) have pointed out, however, that it could threaten the constitutional rights of citizens even in this revised form.

According to a DAILY WORLD report, when California Senator Cranston, one of the leading critics of the bill, met in February 1980 with representatives of 20 public organizations (including the chairmen of the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation and the National Lawyers Guild), it was noted that the draft federal criminal code would broaden federal jurisdiction at the cost of state government jurisdiction, that this "could lay the basis for the creation of a national police force" and that the bill, in its present form, contradicts constitutional civil freedoms and threatens the rights listed in the first amendment because it augments the judicial powers of prosecutors by reducing the prerogatives of judges, and so forth.<sup>19</sup>

#### IV

The U.S. Constitution declares certain principles which are intended to prevent the misuse of power by judicial organs, guarantee the inviolability of each citizen's person and property and preclude the possibility of illegal imprisonment. In particular, the fourth amendment specifies "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches



and seizures," and the fifth amendment states that a citizen shall not be deprived of "life or property without due process of law." The principle of "due process of law" is given the broadest interpretation in the American legal system and includes the observance of judicial standards, established by law or the decisions of judicial bodies, for the correct and legal conduct of criminal trials. In other words, the observance of the "due process of law" requirement is the same as the observance of legality.<sup>20</sup>

The practices of the American system of criminal justice, however, indicate that the violation of civil rights and the principle of legality by the guardians of the law is widespread in the United States. The standards of "due process of law" are most often violated in incidents involving political activists. When they are tried, the police and the prosecution resort to the overt fabrication of damaging evidence, pressure witnesses and act in violation of the criminal trial procedures established by law and the constitution. In particular, they violate the rules pertaining to searches, arrests and identification set forth in the fourth amendment to the constitution, corresponding Supreme Court decisions and state laws. As specified in the report of an international group of lawyers on the violation of human rights in the United States, many political activists have become the targets of provocation in connection with their political activity, have been arrested without sufficient grounds, have been the victims of all sorts of entrapment, and have suffered the effects of false damaging testimony, as a result of which they have been unjustly convicted.

It was precisely on these grounds that a jury acquitted one of the Black Panther Party's founders, Huey Newton, who had been accused of murder. The prosecution was able to produce only two of the four witnesses. One witness, who had, as was subsequently learned, been "coached" by the prosecution, was in prison at the time the crime was committed, and another witness refused to testify against Newton in court and said that he had given his original testimony under duress. Despite the above-mentioned acquittal by the jury (by a vote of 10 to 2), the judge declared a mistrial and ruled that a new trial date be set.

Another former Black Panther Party leader, E. Pratt, petitioned the California State Corrections Department for compensation for the incorrect verdict that had put him behind bars for more than 7 years on false charges. When Pratt was convicted of murdering a woman in 1968, he was under surveillance by the FBI, an office of the Department of Justice and the Los Angeles Police Department. The files kept by these agencies on E. Pratt should have contained the information that he was hundreds of miles away from the scene of the crime when the murder was committed. All three agencies made every effort to avoid turning over these files to Pratt's attorneys on the pretext that the documents had been mislaid, that they were confidential, and so forth. When he was brought to trial in 1972, he was convicted on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses: one who regularly testified for the police in court and another who was the husband of the victim and who described a totally different individual. The agencies that were investigating Pratt continued to pressure the prison administration after he had been taken under custody, demanding his incarceration under harsher conditions. As a result, E. Pratt spent 7 years in solitary confinement.<sup>21</sup>

A court of appeals in the state of South Dakota affirmed the verdict passed on American Indian Movement activist Dick Marshall. He was sentenced to life

imprisonment in 1975 on the basis of testimony by a sole witness--an Indian woman. Later she told how two FBI agents, named Price and Wood, threatened to kill her and her six-year-old daughter if she should refuse to testify against Marshall at his trial. Judge Tice, who tried the case, did not feel that the behavior of the FBI agents was in any way reprehensible.<sup>22</sup>

A great deal of publicity was received by the case of American Indian Leonard Peltier, convicted as an accessory to the murder of two FBI agents on Pine Ridge Reservation (South Dakota) in 1973. The police broke into the reservation along with FBI agents and opened fire. One Indian and two FBI were shot to death in the fight. It later became known that the police had provoked this armed confrontation for the purpose of giving the authorities "legal grounds" to take Indian lands rich in uranium ore away from the Pine Ridge Indians. What is more, no one was ever tried for the murder of the Indian.

Citizens unconnected with politics also suffer constantly from violations of legality and the abuse of power by police. In 1978 and 1979 alone, the civil rights office of the Department of Justice received around 21,000 complaints citing violations of the constitutional rights of citizens by policemen and employees of other law enforcement agencies; less than a third of these complaints were officially investigated. The findings of the investigations were submitted to the court in only 120 cases, the individuals responsible were charged in only 85 cases, complete investigations were made in 62 cases, and 76 of the persons involved in these cases were acquitted.<sup>23</sup>

The scales of police brutality in dealings with the public are attested to, in particular, by the practices of the Philadelphia Police Department. The violations of civil rights and acts of brutality by police in this city led to an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice. As a result of this investigation, in August 1979 the department brought action against Mayor F. Rizzo and 20 high-level officials in the municipal government and police department. The municipal and police leadership was accused of "setting a course which led to widespread and serious abuses of power by police in the treatment of citizens." Each year around 1,100 complaints were lodged against the Philadelphia Police Department, and an average of around 75 people died of police gunshot wounds. The suit brought by the Department of Justice stated that police actions had resulted "in serious and widespread violations of the rights of Philadelphia's inhabitants..., who have been systematically subjected to acts of physical and mental cruelty, unwarranted punishment and racial and ethnic discrimination."

In particular, the suit stated that a system of investigation had been created within the police force which allowed abuses of power to be concealed; illegal arrests, searches and the unwarranted detention of citizens became widespread; the police often tried to cover up their own brutal treatment of citizens by falsely accusing them of "assaulting an officer of the law"; suspects were regularly subjected to violence to make them confess; the unwarranted use of guns became common practice; the investigation of complaints about police actions, particularly complaints made by blacks and the Spanish-speaking population, was only perfunctory; the surveillance and intimidation of political activists was widespread.<sup>24</sup>

In essence, the constitutional prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" (eighth amendment) is violated by the conditions in many American prisons and acts of lawlessness by prison authorities.<sup>25</sup> The conditions under which children are incarcerated constitute one of the most scandalous features of the system of corrective institutions in the United States. A report prepared by the American Children's Relief Fund notes: "In all of the states we visited, children were incarcerated in adult prisons. There were no exceptions to this rule in any part of the country. Juveniles were found in big city prisons and rural county jails. The percentage of black and Spanish-speaking children in prison was disproportionately high--31.8 percent."

In the beginning of 1980 the largest prison riot since the time of the Attica events (in 1971) broke out in a prison in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and resulted in 42 deaths. Around 1,100 prisoners rioted after taking 15 guards and members of the prison administration hostage. The prisoners made several demands: better food and living conditions for inmates, more visits by relatives, higher pay for work than the present 25 cents an hour, and so forth.<sup>26</sup>

In the middle of last year the trial of the "Pontiac Brothers" (28 blacks and 3 Spanish-speaking Americans) began. These men are prisoners who have been accused of organizing the July 1978 riot in Pontiac Prison (Illinois), during which three white Americans were killed. This prison, 80 percent of the inmates of which are black, is filled to double capacity. After the riot the prison was completely closed to visitors (including attorneys) for a long time.

The trial of the 10 "Napanoch Brothers" (nine Spanish-speaking Americans and one black), accused of organizing a riot in the prison in Napanoch (New York), began early last year in New York. The inmates took hostages and demanded the replacement of several guards and prison administrators on the grounds that they were members of the Ku Klux Klan and were subjecting minority prisoners to constant discrimination and humiliation.<sup>27</sup>

The increasing frequency of riots in American prisons is the clearest reflection of the prisoners' reaction to the conditions of their life behind bars.

A former inmate of a hard labor camp in Angola Prison (Louisiana) said at a press conference in New Orleans that he had personally witnessed daily beatings of inmates by guards. "Our faces were always bruised. We were always poisoned with tear gas for talking too loudly. There were five or six prisoners to a single cell--with a single cot. Some were handcuffed to the bars and beaten."

There is a special block of solitary confinement cells in Marion Federal Prison. This is where inmates from all federal corrective institutions who protest the unlawful behavior of prison authorities are locked up for an indefinite period. Various methods of mind control, including the forced ingestion of narcotics, are used on the prisoners in this block. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the number of suicides among prisoners in this special block is five times as high as the average for all inmates of American prisons.<sup>28</sup>



Numerous violations of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of U.S. citizens not only contradict the laws, as such, but are also inconsistent with the slogans declared so loudly by Washington. Above all, we are referring to the notorious campaign "in defense of human rights." While they moralize about human rights on the global scale, Washington officials obviously prefer to "not notice" that these rights are being violated in the United States just as widely today as in the past.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in: PRAVDA, 19 May 1980.
2. Lists of the victims of the American judicial system, persecuted for political reasons, quite often include the names of non-white U.S. citizens, and this is not only a result of the racism that is deeply rooted in American society. In the bourgeois society, private property ownership lies at the basis of the protection of political rights, and this is why the first victims of repression are persons with little or no personal property; the percentage of blacks, Spanish-speaking Americans and Indians in this group is much higher than the percentage of whites.
3. Quoted in: B. S. Nikiforov, "The Reform of Criminal Law in the United States," SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA ZAKONNOST', No 11, 1976, p 77.
4. "Criminal Justice in America. A Critical Understanding," edited by R. Quinney, Boston, 1974, pp 138-139.
5. THE GUARDIAN, 20 June 1979.
6. Ibid., 27 June 1979.
7. Ibid., 6 June 1979.
8. Quoted in: "Statement of National Conference of Black Lawyers. World Conference for the Eradication of Racism and Racial Discrimination," Basel, 18-21 May 1978, p 3.
9. THE GUARDIAN, 19 September 1978.
10. "Statement of National Conference of Black Lawyers," p 4.
11. B. Woodward and S. Armstrong, "The Brethren. Inside the Supreme Court," N.Y., 1979, p 205.
12. THE GUARDIAN, 5 September 1979.
13. Ibid.
14. M. Halperin, J. Berman, R. Borosage and C. Harwick, "The Lawless State. The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies," N.Y., 1976, p 239.

15. "Statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Attorney General, Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, FBI Charter, 6 September 1979," Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice; A. G. Tikhonova, "Lawlessness Legitimized?" SSMA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 8, 1980.
16. THE GUARDIAN, 5 September 1979.
17. "Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," bk III. Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session, Wash., 1976, p 12.
18. THE GUARDIAN, 23 May 1979.
19. DAILY WORLD, 6 February 1980.
20. The violation of the constitutional right of people to not be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" is a crime punishable, according to federal law, by imprisonment and a fine (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 242).
21. THE GUARDIAN, 5 September 1979.
22. Ibid.
23. "The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States, 1978," Wash., 1979, p 135; "The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States, 1979," Wash., 1980, p 111.
24. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, 13 August 1979.
25. This practice is discussed in detail in the famous study by American journalist J. Mitford, whose book has been translated into Russian (J. Mitford, "Tyuremnyy biznes" [The Prison Business], Moscow, 1978). The data cited in this article were published in the United States in 1978-1980.
26. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4-5 February 1980.
27. THE GUARDIAN, 5 September 1979; 27 June 1980.
28. DAILY WORLD, 11 April 1980.

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## THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: SOME PROBLEMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 27-35

[Article by A. A. Kokoshin]

[Text] The problem of the role of government has been the subject of many heated political debates in U.S. history. Various institutions of the imperialist state become perceptibly stronger during the process of the development of state-monopoly capitalism. "In particular, imperialism, the era of banking capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopolies, the era of monopolistic capitalism's evolution into state-monopoly capitalism, will demonstrate the extraordinary reinforcement of the 'machinery of state,' the unprecedented growth of its bureaucratic and military staff in connection with intensified repression against the proletariat,"<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin pointed out.

The increase of state intervention in the economy and in social processes and the augmentation of the state's role in national politics constitute, as the example of the United States illustrates, a far from linear process. This process has been sharply accelerated at certain stages in this nation and has slowed down somewhat at other times.<sup>2</sup> In the 1970's, the reduced effectiveness of state bodies was apparent throughout the United States, and this represents one of the indicators of the crisis in the system of state-monopoly regulation. This is manifested on all of the main levels of the machinery of state and is characteristic of both the executive and the legislative branches of government. Questions connected with the effectiveness of government's role, the scales of government bodies and the nature of their functioning became one of the main issues in the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns, campaigns for elections to the Senate and House of Representatives, and local government elections. These questions are directly related to other socioeconomic problems of American imperialism: They also affect the government's ability to conduct a purposeful and coordinated domestic and foreign policy in the interests of the dominant class.

Government property has now reached gigantic proportions in the United States: By the beginning of the 1970's, the assets of just the federal government already totaled 422 billion dollars, surpassing the combined assets of the 250 largest private corporations.<sup>3</sup> In recent decades, government expenditures have risen steadily, accompanied by a corresponding rise in the taxes paid by the public. For example, whereas federal expenditures totaled 2.6 billion dollars in 1929, 41.3 in 1949, 91 billion in 1959 and 188.4 billion in 1969, in 1979 the figure had reached 507 billion dollars.<sup>4</sup> The budget proposed by the Carter Administration for



fiscal year 1981 envisaged expenditures of 615.8 billion dollars.<sup>5</sup> Federal expenditures have risen from 2.5 percent of the gross national product to 21.6 percent.<sup>6</sup> The military expenditures of the government are tremendous--over 20 percent of the federal budget. In the second half of the 1970's, the U.S. national debt reached 967 billion dollars (in 1977), with the federal government accounting for 709 billion.<sup>7</sup>

The growth of the federal budget has been accompanied by a noticeable rise in the number of various government bodies and civil servants. For example, whereas the number of persons employed in the executive branch rose 20 percent in the period between the two world wars, in the mid-1970's it was 120 percent higher than in the last pre-war year. New federal administrations and committees appeared at a much quicker rate than the old ones were dissolved. The life span of individual agencies established to carry out certain specific programs also became much longer.<sup>8</sup>

The growth of government property and of budget expenditures is not the only result of the augmentation of government's role. In the 1970's, attempts were made to strengthen the regulating role of government in the economic sphere; the most significant of these were the price and wage controls set by President Nixon for the first time in U.S. history in a time of peace (1971). New regulatory bodies, whose activities affect the practices of all private enterprises, have sprung up. They include the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

On the whole, government regulatory bodies grew so much in the 1970's that the government does not even have any precise idea of their actual number and structure. According to data for 1978, as cited in Congress' official organ THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, there are 44 regulatory agencies and administrations on the federal level in the United States in addition to 1,240 different councils and commissions.<sup>9</sup>

The entire staff of the federal executive branch has become much more complex in structure; the number of its employees now exceeds 2 million.

The growth in the size and complexity of the civil service has been accompanied by the increasingly apparent decline of its effectiveness, both from the standpoint of ruling class interests and in the view of the general public, since the controls of state regulation are usually handled by those who are supposed to be "regulated" and the political experts and politicians serving them.

This phenomenon was quite apparent in the "Great Society" program of the Johnson Administration. According to Yale University Professor R. Winter, for example, this program, which was supposed to focus on the poorest strata of the U.S. population, actually served primarily to strengthen the position of certain political figures within the more wealthy and politically active population strata of their districts, and they were the ones who received the lion's share of the government "assistance." Huge sums were also absorbed by the maintenance of the excessively large bureaucratic staff engaged in carrying out the program. According to the calculations of the same expert, if the "assistance" offered by federal and local governments had gone directly to the 25 million officially registered poor people

and had not been wasted on the maintenance of the staff, each poor family would have had a much higher income level with the same volume of social policy.<sup>10</sup>

Dissatisfaction with the economic, political and social results obtained by the government system naturally coexisted with growing dissatisfaction with the very workings of the machinery of state.

Many programs are duplicated and scattered among the most diverse agencies with virtually no interaction between them.

An example of the increasing ineffectiveness of federal bodies can be seen in the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission, which spent 157 million dollars over a period of 4 years and set only three standards.<sup>11</sup> The greatest hopes were invested in this commission, however, when it was created; it was established under the pressure of a strong consumer movement, which was working toward stronger government control over the production of consumer goods by monopolies. Anyone with some knowledge of the American lobbying mechanism can correctly conclude that the scandalous inactivity of this body was primarily due to the impeding and obstructing influence of concerned monopolies and their supporters on its work.

A source of tremendous losses for the American society is all of the obsolete and virtually unnecessary paperwork circulated throughout the nation by various agencies--forms to be filled out by individuals and private enterprises. According to the calculations of American experts, losses resulting from this flood of paperwork reach up to 10 billion dollars a year.<sup>12</sup>

There is no question that one of the main spendthrifts in the federal bureaucratic system is the Pentagon. It is this agency that is distinguished by the quickest rise in the salaries of top-level military and civilian personnel. According to the estimates of Brookings Institution economists, if the salaries of civilian administrative officials in the Department of Defense were equal to the salaries of employees on the same level in the private sector, the Pentagon budget could be reduced by 900 million dollars.<sup>13</sup>

Nepotism and favoritism are in full bloom in government agencies. According to J. Solomon, former chief of the General Services Administration, many of the people who have prospered in these agencies rose to administrative positions with the aid of their patrons and then appointed their own friends to high-level positions. In many cases, high-level officials create completely unnecessary jobs for their friends.

Extravagance and inefficiency are also characteristic of both houses of the U.S. Congress, from which criticizing remarks in reference to the bureaucracy of the executive branch can be heard quite frequently. The latest studies indicate that the cost of the functioning of Congress in the 1970's rose much more quickly than the operating costs of the executive branch: The congressional cost rose from 251 million dollars in 1970 to 357 million in 1978 and is still rising at an unprecedented rate. Part of this rise is a result of the salary increases established by the members of both houses for themselves. In 1977 they voted for a 29-percent increase in their already high salaries, which were 57,000 dollars a year at that time. Another example of Congress' extravagance is its own police force, numbering 1,186 individuals; by American standards, this is enough to serve a city with a population of half a million.

The congressional staff has grown considerably in recent years: Between 1968 and 1979 it increased from 11,700 individuals to 18,400. The staff of Senate assistants and technical secretaries doubled during that time, and the average senator had 68 employees by the beginning of the 1980's.<sup>14</sup>

Another permanent disease found in American government bodies on all levels--graft and other forms of corruption--also received new impetus in its development in the 1970's.

The Congress was particularly successful in this area in the last decade: 51 members of the highest legislative body of the United States were accused of various "serious offenses"; 31 Democratic and 20 Republican legislators were found guilty of embezzling government funds, of accepting illegal campaign contributions (including some from representatives of foreign states), of taking bribes and so forth. What is more, for various reasons this official list does not include the names of such prominent figures as former Senator H. Scott, who was found guilty of taking bribes, Congressman W. Hayes, who supported a mistress with federal funds, and 18 members of Congress (including the chairmen of the ethics committees of both houses) who enjoyed the "favors" of armament manufacturers, which took the form of costly hunting trips and so forth.<sup>15</sup>

Incidentally, even when they are found guilty of crimes and acquire criminal records, most congressmen escape punishment. For example, only 1 of the 24 legislators who were seriously implicated in the scandal involving the bribes distributed so generously by the South Korean CIA and South Korean businessmen was sentenced to prison.<sup>16</sup>

As early as the 1960's the U.S. federal leadership attempted the "radical" improvement of the system. The services of many economists, sociologists, psychologists, management experts and others were enlisted for work in government agencies. Various technocratic solutions to social problems became popular. Agencies quickly acquired electronic computers and different types of office equipment. The number of scientists working in agencies of the executive branch rose 49 percent in the 1960's, including a rise of 58 percent in the number of experts in the social sciences. This exceeded the growth rate of the government system as a whole.<sup>17</sup> Computer equipment was still being incorporated at a rapid rate.

Macroeconomic modeling underwent considerable development in the United States in the 1960's. Federal consultants were supposed to use this as a basis for forecasts of the state of the economy and recommendations regarding the government regulation of economic processes.

However, the introduction of new methods into the work of various agencies and the attempts to use computers effectively on the highest levels of administration as well as in secondary and auxiliary fields did not produce the anticipated results with regard to the improvement of the federal machinery of state. There would seem to be many reasons for this. Many of the methods which had proved quite effective in the private sector were essentially unsuitable in the public sector, but this was not immediately apparent. These methods were often introduced too quickly, without the necessary changes in the organizational structure of the machinery of state and the necessary retraining of personnel, without consideration for the tremendous force of inertia in the mental processes of bureaucrats.



In many cases, the use of new planning and programming methods was covertly, and often even overtly, resisted by officials because change would tend to reveal more clearly the subdivisions that were unnecessary or superfluous in the new system and would result in their subsequent elimination, just as in the elimination of a number of prominent positions occupied for many years by influential persons backed up by coalitions that had taken shape decades before in the labyrinths of the Washington power hierarchy. Even in the Department of Defense, which would appear to be most consistent with the interests of the top leadership of the capitalist state, the PPB (planning-programming-budgeting) system was immediately resisted. The reason for this was the reluctance of influential groups of prominent military and civilian officials to give up the system of defense budget compilation that allowed them to distribute funds primarily in accordance with their own interests rather than the national interest. For this reason, it is not surprising that quite soon after R. McNamara left the office of defense secretary, one of his successors, M. Laird, actually rejected some components of the PPB system. Ironically enough, this was done at the precise time when the Nixon Administration was trying to incorporate this and other similar systems on a broad scale throughout the government as a whole.

The attempts to improve the system of planning and administration in various departments and agencies soon convinced the Nixon Administration that it would be impossible unless the agencies of the executive branch were radically reorganized. This agreed with President Nixon's desire to make these agencies more manageable by means of the more pronounced centralization of their leadership. This gave rise to the plans to transform most of the federal organs of power, including several dozen departments and agencies, into four "superdepartments," which would be headed by administrators fitting President Nixon's specifications.<sup>18</sup>

These dreams were not destined to come true. The objections of democratic forces in the nation to Nixon's authoritarian plans combined, paradoxically enough, with the struggle of the federal bureaucracy for its own selfish interests, as a result of which the problems connected with enhancing the effectiveness of federal bodies remained unsolved. What is more, the tendency toward the diminished effectiveness of these bodies became even more pronounced in the second half of the 1970's.

During the 1976 campaign, J. Carter paid special attention to the problems of bureaucracy in his speeches and promised to significantly reduce the number of federal bodies and enhance their operational efficiency if he were elected. His attempts to keep these promises were resisted by the same Washington "power centers." This occurred despite the fact that many conditions seemed favorable for the programs announced by Carter. After the Watergate scandal, U.S. ruling circles again began to favor the reinforcement of presidential authority, and this was reflected, for example, in the tone used by the mass media in their coverage of the new administration's activity; in addition, the Republican departure from the White House ended the period of "divided government," in which the Republican President had to surmount additional obstacles in connection with the presence of a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress.

As it turned out, however, the Carter Administration was capable of implementing civil service reform only on a limited scale, although the need for this reform had arisen many years before, and of making some generally futile attempts to enhance, at least to some slight extent, the operational efficiency of regulatory

agencies and administrations (for this purpose, two additional agencies were created as part of the White House staff--a regulatory activity analysis group and a council on regulatory agencies). The number of agencies remained virtually the same. What is more, two new large departments were created--the departments of energy and education. This testified to broader government intervention in the economic, social and cultural life of the nation.

The creation of the Department of Energy, with its staff of 19,500 and annual budget of 10.8 billion dollars (this is, for example, four times as high as the 1978 profits of the largest American corporation, Exxon),<sup>19</sup> was particularly significant in this connection. Another important move to augment the role of government in the U.S. energy industry was the decision to establish a federal corporation for the mass production of synthetic fuel, although most of the funding for its activities (the cost of the program was set at 88 billion dollars) would not come from the federal budget.<sup>20</sup>

The question of the scales and consequences of government activity and the operational efficiency of government bodies is most adamantly raised in the United States by conservative and rightist circles. Extensive and purposeful propaganda against the activities of bodies regulating environmental protection, safety on the job and food quality control can be found in the press organs of monopolistic circles (BUSINESS WEEK, FORTUNE, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL and others). Thousands of Washington lobbyists are obstructing the activities of regulatory bodies that might somehow restrict the interests of individual monopolies or their associations.

Under the conditions of the new wave of mergers and acquisitions, an increasingly heated battle is being fought in the upper echelon of American business over the enforcement and development of antitrust legislation.<sup>21</sup> The scales of mergers and acquisitions in some already highly monopolized branches of production have grown so much that many bourgeois writers have had to frankly discuss the disappearance of "free competition" in these spheres. This is particularly characteristic of the energy industry, where, according to University of Michigan Professor W. Adams, the continued subordination of other sources of energy to the petroleum giants will lead to "supermonopolization."<sup>22</sup>

Because the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has attempted to somehow limit the activities of the largest monopolies in the interests of the American capitalist system as a whole--at least for the purpose of preserving the semblance of "free enterprise" and the "democratic nature of the American economy"--it has recently been subjected to increasingly perceptible pressure by various monopolistic groups and their proteges in Congress. More frequent attacks are also being made on the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, headed by E. Kennedy, which drafted and introduced envisaging additional restrictions on the creation of gigantic conglomerates by means of acquisitions and mergers.

The present leadership of the Federal Trade Commission and Senate Committee on the Judiciary has been attacked by powerful business associations--The National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which have actually demanded that the special status of this committee be eradicated by granting Congress the right to veto any of its regulatory actions or to take a number of other measures.<sup>23</sup> Just as many times before in American history, the FTC is being accused of limiting the rights of "free enterprise," of "adhering to socialist

ideas" and of committing other infractions seen as serious sins by American capitalists. For example, Formica Corporation administrator J. Alexander called M. Pertachuk, the present chairman of the FTC, "one of the most dangerous people in America" and a "consummate socialist" in an article in the WASHINGTON STAR.<sup>24</sup>

Now that the state of the economy is constantly growing worse and the masses are losing faith in all of the main institutions of American society, the monopolistic bourgeoisie makes deliberate references to the federal bureaucracy and local government authorities in its propaganda to redirect public dissatisfaction in precisely this direction, and away from criticism of big business. This tactic has frequently proved successful, particularly now that the effectiveness of government bodies is actually quite low.

Just as much dissatisfaction with government regulatory measures is felt by the middle and petty, non-monopolistic bourgeoisie. What is more, the members of this group experience more difficulties than the bigger monopolists in escaping the need to pay taxes. There are more pronounced "anti-state" feelings in large segments of the middle strata, with their inordinate share of the tax burden. This was reflected, in particular, in the famous "taxpayers' revolt" in the large American state of California in 1978, as a result of which so-called "Proposition 13" was passed. According to J. Quirt, an expert from the magazine of the business community, FORTUNE, it led to the largest tax cut in American history that was directly brought about by a large group of taxpayers.<sup>25</sup> The property tax cut took more than 7 billion dollars out of the total 40 billion-dollar budget of the state, its 58 counties, 417 cities, 1,046 school districts and 4,710 special districts.<sup>26</sup> This benefited many wealthy homeowners, but it was even more to the advantage of businessmen and private corporations. The latter include such monopolistic giants as the Bank of America, Atlantic Richfield, Southern Pacific and other corporations and banks which are not in any sense smothered by their tax burden. Low-income families, on the other hand, gained nothing from the tax cut. What is more, this group suffered as a result of the revision of local government budgets because this led to cuts in allocations for education, medical assistance and so forth.

The California events of 1978 were far from an isolated incident. The same kind of taxpayers' movement has spread to many other states and has sometimes taken even more conservative and more reactionary forms.

Monopolistic propaganda has convinced a large part of the population that it is precisely the "high level" of government spending--primarily on social needs--that is the main cause of the inflation that had become the number-one economic, social and political problem in the United States by the beginning of the 1980's. The actions of the monopolistic upper echelon against "big government" are aimed at blaming it for the reduced effectiveness of the private sector in the American economy. Mass and professional publications controlled by the monopolies are full of information about the kind of losses business suffers from regulatory measures. For example, D. Mahoney, chairman of the board of Norton and Simon, one of the largest advertising firms in America, cites data which indicate that just the additional expense of filling out reports for various government agencies costs private companies around 25-30 billion dollars a year; total expenditures connected with the observance of all government regulations regarding business reach as high as 98 billion dollars a year.<sup>27</sup>



According to the calculations of Chase Manhattan Bank economists (printed in a paid advertisement in popular HARPERS magazine), in 1979 the observance of government regulations cost more than 100 billion dollars, which constituted 4.5 percent of the gross national product and was equivalent to 60 percent of all private investments in U.S. industry that year.<sup>28</sup>

During the 1980 campaign, criticism of "big government" and appeals for the limitation of government interference in the economy, in social processes and in the daily life of the "average American" became one of the basic themes of R. Reagan's speeches, as well as the speeches of many politicians campaigning in Senate, House of Representatives, gubernatorial and state legislative assembly races. This theme also played a part in President Carter's campaign tactics, although in slightly different form. Saying less about the problem of "big government" than his Republican rivals, he took several steps to limit expenditures on social needs, striving to thereby reduce the federal budget deficit and curb the inflationary effect of government spending. At the same time, Carter announced a new and quite sizeable increase in military spending. This--particularly over the long range--is inconsistent with the requirements of anti-inflationary policy but consistent with his line of escalating international tension.

Cuts in social programs injure the poorest strata of the American population, including members of racial and ethnic minorities, whose position had already become quite shaky in recent years in connection with the general deterioration of the state of the U.S. economy and the new offensive launched by the monopolies on the economic position of the workers. This is creating additional conditions for another social upheaval, similar to the one which shook the United States in the 1960's.

Democratic forces in the United States, aware of the ineffectiveness of government bodies and the extravagance and irresponsibility of bureaucrats, are demanding that the scales of government activity be reduced not by means of cuts in social programs but, on the contrary, by means of the expansion and improvement of social policy. These demands are supported by extremely broad segments of the U.S. population. Several public opinion polls have indicated that the American public is now more likely than in the 1970's to believe that active government intervention in economic and social relations is necessary. Whereas 63 percent of Americans believed that the government was obligated to provide all people with jobs in 1960, the figure exceeded 70 percent by the end of the 1970's. During the same years, the percentage of persons in favor of government assistance in public health services rose from 64 to 81 percent. In 1966 the numbers of persons for and against government price and wage controls were approximately equal; in 1978 the ratio was 2:1 in favor of the institution of these controls.<sup>29</sup>

Democratic forces in the nation are also working toward the kind of tax reform that would eliminate the many loopholes used by corporations and private individuals with large incomes to avoid the payment of taxes. Using these loopholes with the help of highly paid attorneys, the monopolistic upper echelon in America annually underpays just the federal treasury a sum exceeding even budget allocations for military purposes.

Mass democratic organizations, including an increasing number of labor unions, are also opposing the new sharp increase in military spending and the cuts in federal

budget appropriations for the most urgent social needs. Progressive forces are fighting more and more energetically for stronger public control over the activities of private corporations, which are increasingly contrary to the national interest.

This is how prerequisites are springing up in the United States for the further exacerbation of the political struggle over problems in the machinery of state.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 33.
2. See, for example, N. V. Sivachev, "State-Monopoly Capitalism in the United States (the Genesis and Evolution of the Latest Socioeconomic and Political-Ideological Doctrines)," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 7, 1977.
3. FORTUNE, May 1973, p 194.
4. THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, 19 January 1980, p 88.
5. NEWSWEEK, 4 February 1980, p 38.
6. THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, 19 January 1980, p 88.
7. "Statistical Abstract of the United States," Wash., 1979, p 283.
8. H. Heclio, "A Government of Strangers. Executive Politics in Washington," Wash., 1978, p 17.
9. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 26 June 1978, p S-9790.
10. REGULATIONS, March-April 1978, pp 11-14.
11. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 18 September 1978, p 29.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p 31.
14. WALL STREET JOURNAL, 18 December 1979.
15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 February 1980.
16. Ibid.
17. J. Straussman, "The Limits of Technocratic Politics," New Brunswick (N.J.), 1978, pp 8-9.
18. In accordance with this grand plan, only the state, defense, treasury and justice departments would retain their previous character, with just a few

internal changes ("Papers Relating to the President's Departmental Reorganization Program," A Reference Compilation, Wash., 1971, p 25).

19. NEWSWEEK, 20 August 1979, p 27.
20. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 19 January 1980, p 100.
21. In 1978, 2,106 mergers and acquisitions were announced; companies valued at over 100 million dollars accounted for 80 of these. This was a rise of 95 percent over 1977; the volume of mergers and acquisitions in 1978 was 471 percent greater than the 1975 volume. In acquisitions, the largest corporations generally acquire companies in other branches of industrial production, and this is not covered by existing antitrust legislation (NATIONAL JOURNAL, 24 March 1979, p 480).

At the end of the 1970's, the mergers and acquisitions of central interest in America involved such gigantic monopolies as Occidental Petroleum, the Mead Corporation (acquired), Standard Oil of California (acquiring Amex), United Technologies (acquiring Carper), Kennecott Copper (acquiring Carborundum) and Pillsbury (acquiring Green Giant)--(DUN'S REVIEW, December 1978, p 6).

22. Ibid.
23. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 11 August 1979, p 1647.
24. Ibid., p 1648.
25. J. Quirt, "Aftershocks from the Great California Taxquake," FORTUNE, 23 September 1978, p 75.
26. Ibid.
27. D. Mahoney, "National Issues and Consumer Attitudes. A Time for Business Leadership," VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, vol XLIV, 1 July 1978, pp 546-548.
28. HARPERS, December 1979, p 31.
29. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 12, 1979, p 14.

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## THE TURN IN U.S. SOUTH ASIAN POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 36-46

[Article by N. S. Beglova]

[Text] The Carter presidency will end in January 1981. What are the results of his administration's policy in South Asia?

During the 1976 campaign and the beginning of his term in office, J. Carter announced his intention to conduct a policy of "minimal presence" in South Asia and to give more consideration to the interests of the South Asian countries. Soon after the Carter Administration took power, however, the United States began to take much more interest in events in South Asia. It was at that time that the policy of "minimal presence" began to be criticized more and more in American newspapers and magazines. University of California Professor L. Rose, for example, stated that the United States should expand its "political and economic involvement" in South Asia because the "continuation of the policy of minimal presence in this zone could threaten long-range American goals and plans on the global level."<sup>1</sup>

Washington's present course in this part of the world is distinguished by the unprecedented buildup of U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, the escalation of tension in South Asia and attempts to energize military cooperation with Pakistan and involve the countries of the subcontinent in aggressive actions against neighboring Afghanistan.

How and under what circumstances did this reversal take place?

### South Asia's Importance to the United States

Washington officials are using events in Iran and Afghanistan to justify their own current behavior in the Indian Ocean and in South Asia. President Carter's State of the Union message to Congress on 23 January 1980, for example, implies that the events in Iran and Afghanistan graphically demonstrated the extraordinary strategic significance of the region extending from the Near East to Southwest Asia.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, tremendous significance was attached to this region, particularly South Asia, in the United States long before the events in Iran and Afghanistan. For example, a report entitled "The United States, India and South Asia,"<sup>3</sup> prepared in 1976 by the Library of Congress Research Service, stressed that South Asia was important to the United States from the strategic standpoint because the countries

of the region are located near sea lanes of vital importance to the economies of the United States as well as Western Europe and Japan, and "close to the Persian Gulf zone," which indicated that the United States should promote the creation of some type of "protected rear" on the subcontinent to attain primary objectives in the Near and Middle East.

The long-range factors of military-strategic and political importance to American experts include the "extreme instability" of the situation in this zone, which, in their opinion, could give rise to conflicts that might bring about a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly since the subcontinent is situated near the southern boundary of the Soviet Union. American experts have also repeatedly noted that South Asia will have a considerable effect on developments in the neighboring Persian Gulf and Southeast Asian regions in the next few years, as well as on the situation in Asia as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

Besides this, American political scientists have stressed that all of the main problems of the developing world are concentrated in South Asia and that the developmental "standard" for young states in other regions will depend on how these problems are solved in South Asia. This indicates that South Asia is of much greater significance to the United States than we might assume if we proceed merely from the geopolitical importance of the region.<sup>5</sup>

More attention has recently been given to South Asia's economic importance to the United States. India, for example, has substantial reserves of high-quality iron ore, other metals, coal and bauxite (the United States imports beryl, chrome, iron ore, manganese and thorium from India). There are oil deposits in India and Pakistan and natural gas in Bangladesh. The subcontinent's economic importance to the United States is also due to its position as one of the main consumers of U.S. agricultural "surplus," which has led, as American experts have admitted, to some degree of "interdependence" in U.S. relations with the countries of the subcontinent in the economic sphere.<sup>6</sup>

These are the long-range factors determining the United States' constant interest in South Asia.

In the second half of the 1970's, however, significant changes took place in the South Asian countries and in neighboring Persian Gulf and Southeast Asian countries, which forced the United States to keep an even more watchful eye on South Asia. The defeat of Pol Pot's gangs in Kampuchea, the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO and the collapse of this pro-American bloc illustrated the growing desire of the people of this region for political and economic independence. In the mid-1970's, India's influence increased considerably on the subcontinent as well as in the international arena as a whole. As noted in the abovementioned report on "The United States, India and South Asia," the most important event of the 1970's in South Asia was "India's evolution into a serious force in the international arena...and its establishment as the dominant regional power."<sup>7</sup>

South Asia is also arousing heightened interest in the United States in connection with the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. Besides this, the South Asian region is playing a more important role in American "post-Vietnam" military strategic plans. These plans envisage the reorganization of the Pentagon's support

points, the establishment of new bases and the enlargement of old ones, particularly the bases in the Indian Ocean on the island of Diego Garcia and a number of bases in the Persian Gulf zone. In view of India's negative response to all these measures, however, Washington officials are trying to reconsider the group of measures intended to prevent, or at least to neutralize, the escalation of tension in Indian-American relations.

These fundamental considerations regarding the reasons for South Asia's importance to the United States have now been supplemented by two new factors: In the first place, South Asia's rapprochement with Beijing could turn it into a bridge connecting U.S. strategic support points in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf zone with China; in the second place, American strategists regard South Asia as a region in which, in their opinion, revenge could be taken in the future for the victory of national liberation movements in Kampuchea, Iran and Afghanistan.

When President Carter addressed a group of American newspaper editors in February 1979, he stressed: "Upheavals and changes are now taking place in the countries situated in the region stretching from one end of the Indian Ocean to the other"; these should be regarded "not as isolated incidents, but as part of a single current with far-reaching consequences."<sup>8</sup>

This statement reflected Washington's serious worries about the events taking place in this region. The "upheavals and changes" referred to by J. Carter (primarily the events in Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Iran) were of a clearly defined anti-imperialist nature, and the "far-reaching consequences" signified nothing other than the real prospect of the total disintegration of American neocolonialism.

It was no coincidence that the existence of a "crescent of crisis" was postulated at precisely that time, or that the so-called "Carter Doctrine" was formulated a short time later. Washington needed all of this to substantiate the feasibility of a transfer to an offensive U.S. strategy in this part of the world.

This activation of American policy was connected primarily with the growth of U.S. hegemonistic ambitions at that time and the Carter Administration's rejection of the "Nixon Doctrine's" recognition of the limits on American potential to influence international developments, and its rejection of the appeal to adapt to the international situation and conduct a policy of "minimal presence" in the Asian and African countries. Forgetting the lessons of Vietnam and discarding the thesis of "minimal presence," the Carter Administration transferred to an active policy in South Asia and began to augment the American military presence in the Indian Ocean zone--a zone closely connected with the vital interests of the countries of the subcontinent.

This reversal in the Carter Administration's policy reflected the desire of U.S. imperialism to retain its positions in South Asia at any cost. The methods were changed but the goal was still the same. This becomes obvious if we examine the progress of relations with the countries of the subcontinent, especially India and Pakistan, as it was precisely these that have been the determining factor for U.S. policy in South Asia in recent years.



## India in Washington's Plans

Immediately after the inauguration in 1977, the Democratic administration studied the actual state of affairs on the subcontinent, noting that India's influence had grown considerably in the developing countries and in the international arena as a whole, and attempted to energize its policy in this country. It had to take India's views into account in its own policymaking in Asia.

The Carter Administration took several steps to improve American-Indian relations, such as the resumption of economic aid to India, the delivery of two shipments of uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power station, the reduction of protectionist tariffs on some Indian commodities and several other steps.

The coming of a "new" era in Indian-U.S. relations and Washington's "new approach" to India began to be discussed in the White House. In fact, however, the Carter government essentially modeled its behavior on the policy of J. Kennedy, attaching primary significance to relations with India in the conduct of American policy in South Asia and regarding good U.S.-Indian relations as a guarantee of American success in South Asia as well as in the developing countries in general.

Questions of American-Indian cooperation, the augmentation of American aid to India and the activation of American and multilateral "development programs" in this country were discussed in Washington in April 1977 when then Indian Minister of Finance H. M. Patel met with U.S. Secretary of the Treasury M. Blumenthal and IBRD President R. McNamara, in June 1978 when Indian Prime Minister M. Desai visited the United States, and in January 1978 when President Carter went to India.

All of these talks indicated that the United States was attempting to guarantee India a leading role on the subcontinent. During this stage, the United States was prepared to even encroach somewhat upon Pakistan's interests for the sake of its own influence in India. For example, the Carter Administration did not resume U.S. military aid to Pakistan and did not even sanction the sale of American A1-7 aircraft to this country and, later, the F-5E Tiger planes so persistently requested by the Zia-ul-Haq regime. Washington officials believed that this policy would encourage India to converge with the United States, would undermine future Soviet-Indian relations and would weaken Soviet influence in South Asia in general.

It soon became obvious that the American approach to India was "new" only in its wording, while U.S. actions still consisted in attempts to conduct a dialog and build a relationship with India from a neocolonial position, with consideration for only America's own selfish interests. As a result, American-Indian relations were aggravated more than ever before.

When Washington declared its intention to improve American-Indian relations, it did not conceal its desire to bring about certain changes in Indian foreign policy which would obviously injure India's traditional ties with friendly powers.

Another factor creating friction in U.S.-Indian relations is the American military presence in the Indian Ocean, especially the plans to enlarge the U.S. naval base on Diego Garcia. Officials in New Delhi justifiably believe that this U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean will threaten the sovereignty and security of India and all the

other countries of the region and will undermine the efforts to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.<sup>9</sup>

The United States is trying to pressure India by using American private companies operating in that country. Although the volume of direct U.S. capital investments in India is not great--328 million dollars<sup>10</sup>--American companies are striving to penetrate the most promising and profitable branches of the Indian economy. They have gained a firm foothold in the chemical industry, are establishing themselves in the electronic and pharmaceutical industries and have been more active in food production, the textile industry and metalware and leather goods production. The activities of foreign companies, particularly U.S. firms, have often been so flagrant that the Indian government has had to protect the national economy by passing a currency control law, in accordance with which all foreign companies must reduce their share of stock in Indian branches to 40 percent and 74 percent, depending on the particular sphere of activity;<sup>11</sup> this was also the purpose of the 1980 decision to nationalize Indian banks.

There have been serious disagreements between India and the United States in the sphere of bilateral trade and economic relations. Economic relations with the United States are extremely important to India because the United States has been India's chief trade partner for several years. But the United States is obviously not basing its trade with India on equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. This is attested to above all by the fact that the trade balance is generally in favor of the United States. The main reason is the multitude of restrictions on U.S. imports of Indian goods.

In recent years the question of shipments of American uranium fuel to India has considerably complicated relations between Washington and New Delhi (according to an agreement signed in 1963, the United States promised to regularly supply the Tarapur station with uranium fuel until 1993). The U.S. position on shipments of uranium to India is quite contradictory. On the one hand, the United States is acting, as Washington has stressed, in accordance with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while, on the other, it has tried to use India's interest in American uranium for its own purposes by employing uranium shipments as "bait" whenever this fits in with the objectives of American policy in India, and stopping shipments when the need arises to apply pressure on India.

Although the United States has widely publicized its intention to improve relations with India, it has not made any constructive changes in its position in the sphere of U.S.-Indian bilateral relations or in regard to other fundamental aspects of the international situation in South Asia.

Washington used the events of late 1979 and early 1980 in Iran and Afghanistan for new attempts to exert pressure on India, trying to drive a wedge into Soviet-Indian relations with the aid of the myth about the "Soviet threat" to this region. At the end of January a representative of the U.S. President, C. Clifford, was sent to New Delhi for this purpose. At the same time he was supposed to assure India that future shipments of American weapons to Pakistan and past shipments of Chinese weapons would not endanger India's security.

Washington was striving to calm New Delhi's worries about the constantly increasing American and Chinese activity in Asia and was also attempting to bring about an

Indian-Chinese rapprochement. It should be noted that Beijing has recently displayed obvious interest in better relations with New Delhi and has made an effort to demonstrate this interest.

On the other hand, China's continued occupation of 36,000 square kilometers of Indian territory, the construction of the strategic Karakorum highway, which passes through the northern regions of Kashmir, under Pakistan's control, the publication of maps in Beijing depicting part of East India as territory belonging to China, the support of Pakistan in the Kashmir question, the assistance of Pakistan in the development of a nuclear bomb, the claims to the "right to punish" neighbors who are "recalcitrant," and the efforts to establish a united front along with the United States and several Western European countries against the Soviet Union--all of these actions by the Chinese leadership are arousing serious worries in New Delhi and cannot in any way promote the establishment of closer contacts with Beijing. What is more, the present situation in South Asia, in the view of Indian leaders, is setting up new obstacles to the normalization of Indian-Chinese relations. Officials in New Delhi are justifiably afraid that the projected Washington-Beijing axis, with the possible participation of Pakistan, could even be directed against India.

Clifford was unable to convince New Delhi that the resumption of American military shipments to Pakistan did not constitute a threat to the safety of the continent. India's influential STATESMAN newspaper stressed, for example, that "the rearming of Pakistan would inflict the most severe injuries on peace in our region."<sup>12</sup>

The United States was also unable to start quarrels between India and the Soviet Union. The Indian leaders, especially Prime Minister I. Gandhi, have repeatedly announced the inviolability of Indian-Soviet friendship. The Gandhi government has not supported Washington's attempts to escalate international tension, and India has reaffirmed its intention to constantly adhere to an "independent policy of non-alignment." In a TIME magazine interview, I. Gandhi remarked that the projected alliance of "the United States, Pakistan and China will endanger our region"<sup>13</sup> (South Asia--N. B.).

On the whole, according to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, "India's relations with the United States have solidified on the level of icy cordiality."<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, more and more voices in the United States have recently announced the need to make a decisive effort to fundamentally improve American-Indian relations.

According to many experts on U.S. policy in South Asia, Washington's latest move in Pakistan's direction under the influence of the events in Afghanistan and Iran was a serious error on the part of the Carter Administration. They believe that the United States should conduct its policy in South Asia primarily with an eye on India, which already occupies 10th place in the world in terms of levels of economic development and will play an increasingly decisive role in the affairs of South Asia and the Indian Ocean zone. According to, for example, University of Pennsylvania Professor F. Frankel, "the security of this region will ultimately depend largely on India--the largest, most stable and potentially most powerful of the littoral countries."<sup>15</sup> This leads to an obvious conclusion: U.S. policy in South Asia must be based not on reliance on Pakistan, which is economically weak and extremely unstable in the political sense, but on the consolidation of ties



with India, even at the cost of some deterioration in relations with Pakistan. Apparently, this view has met with some support in the White House as well.

Washington has recently made considerable efforts through diplomatic and propaganda channels to, on the one hand, intimidate India with the "Soviet threat" and the "expansionist" plans of the Soviet Union, which are allegedly attested to by the events in Afghanistan, and, on the other, convince the Gandhi government of the expediency of convergence with the United States. American economic aid is again being used as the "bait." For example, the United States considerably increased its aid to India "for development" on a bilateral basis, allocating 135 million dollars in fiscal year 1980.<sup>16</sup> Besides this, a decision was recently made to ship around 40 tons of concentrated uranium to India, which is considerably in excess of previous shipments.

Washington strategists expect these and other measures to redirect Indian policy into a channel more consistent with American interests.

#### American-Pakistani Relations

In the second half of the 1970's, the development of relations with Pakistan--a country which had maintained extremely close contact with the United States throughout the postwar period--was quite uneven.

The attempts of Pakistan's government, which was experiencing domestic political difficulties, to work out a foreign policy taking the needs of the country into account and aimed at mutual understanding with other countries in the region, were opposed by the United States, and this exacerbated American-Pakistani conflicts. In turn, the exacerbation of conflicts in the interrelations between these countries gave rise to zigzags in Washington's policy toward Islamabad.

The spring and summer of 1977 constituted one of the most tense periods in U.S.-Pakistani relations, commencing after then Prime Minister Bhutto accused Washington of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs.

In July 1977 the Bhutto government was overthrown and Bhutto himself was imprisoned and then executed. Pakistan was taken over by the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

The tension in American-Pakistani relations abated after the change of government in Islamabad. By summer 1978, however, the United States had cut off economic aid to Pakistan. The official pretext for this step was Pakistan's decision to acquire a plant in France for the regeneration of nuclear fuel. In fact, however, this reflected Washington's displeasure with trends then becoming apparent in Pakistani foreign policy, particularly its participation in the Belgrade conference of the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries, the expansion of Soviet-Pakistani trade and cultural relations and Pakistan's announcement of its possible withdrawal from the CENTO military-political organization.

The revolution in Iran in the beginning of 1979, which led to the eradication of U.S. domination in this country, forced Washington to pay closer attention to Pakistan. In the 1970's, Iran, due to its growing economic and military potential,

had a great deal of influence in South Asia and was an important instrument of American policy on the subcontinent. Iranian-Pakistani relations had been particularly close and multifaceted. The United States had taken every opportunity to promote their convergence. As University of Minnesota Professor S. Burke noted, Washington was striving to "counter Soviet and Indian influence in the Indian Ocean zone with the influence of Iran, Pakistan and the United States."<sup>17</sup>

The revolution in Iran wrecked Washington's plans and led to a U.S. decision to give Pakistan all-round assistance in the augmentation of its military strength. By 11 November 1979--that is, soon after the situation in Iran had become exacerbated--the United States announced its willingness to sell weapons to Islamabad.

It was precisely then, however, that Pakistan took a step that seriously injured the neocolonial interests of the United States in this country as well as in Asia as a whole. In March 1979 the Pakistani Government announced its decision to withdraw from the CENTO military-political bloc. The foreign affairs adviser of Pakistan's chief military administrator declared that the "pact lost its value when Iran withdrew from it, and we were already approaching this decision ourselves."<sup>18</sup>

This step provided Pakistan with broader opportunities to participate in the movement for nonalignment and to improve relations with India and with Bangladesh, which could have created an atmosphere of peace and cooperation on the subcontinent. The prospect of this course of events in South Asia, however, did not please Washington, and in April 1979 the United States once again announced the termination of economic and military aid to Pakistan.

Within just 3 years, the Carter Administration changed its policy toward Pakistan several times, resorting sometimes to the "whip" and sometimes to the "carrot" in response to various actions by the Zia-ul-Haq government. In connection with this, K. Van Hollen, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, noted that in the 25 years since the United States had first entered into military relations with Pakistan, it had "conducted seven different policies in regard to the shipment of weapons to South Asia," ranging from free deliveries of weapons to Pakistan to a 10-year embargo (from 1965 to 1975) on new lethal weapons. According to him, an extremely important feature of all these policy lines was Washington's desire to "not undermine American interests in India."<sup>19</sup>

There is no question that the absence of a stable, consistent U.S. approach to Pakistan did not aid in the improvement of American-Pakistani relations and led to the growth of friction and mistrust between the two countries.

Not even a year had gone by since the announcement of the latest American embargo when the United States, using the events in Afghanistan as a pretext, took hasty steps to resume not only economic assistance, but also, and primarily, military aid to Pakistan.<sup>20</sup>

The White House's attempt to use Pakistan as the main link in the institution of its aggressive policy in South Asia was no coincidence. After the collapse of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan was the only country in this region which had ally relations with the United States in the form of the "cooperation agreement" signed in

1959. What is more, this agreement was of a military nature as well. Besides this, as the WASHINGTON POST frankly admitted, Pakistan's geographic location was "quite convenient" because it could be used as a base for the support of Afghan rebels, it included convenient spots for airfields and naval facilities in support of Washington's commitment to "defend" the Persian Gulf, and it offered possibilities for the placement of the type of technical reconnaissance facilities that had previously been situated in Iran.<sup>21</sup>

The choice also fell to Pakistan because Islamabad had maintained friendly ties with Beijing as well as Washington for the last decade. The "parallelism" of U.S. and Chinese interests in South Asia had been apparent since the late 1960's and early 1970's. Today Beijing and Washington are converging more and more and are coordinating their efforts to escalate tension in South Asia.

Finally, frightened by the revolution in Iran, concerned about a repetition of these events in neighboring countries and disturbed by the presence of serious disagreements among the Moslem countries, which could lead to conflicts, the United States made an attempt to unite the Moslem countries on an anti-Soviet platform. Washington assigned an important role in the implementation of these plans to Pakistan, which had maintained active contact with the majority of Moslem countries and agreed with the U.S. view of the events in Afghanistan.

Although Zia-ul-Haq called the 400 million dollars in "aid" offered by the Carter Administration "peanuts"<sup>22</sup> and rejected the offer, the United States was not very disturbed, judging by all indications, by Islamabad's rejection. According to many in Washington, this gave the United States an opportunity to soberly weigh all of the "pros" and "cons" of reliance on Pakistan. Van Hollen, for example, advised the government to "assess external and internal threats to Pakistan's security more thoroughly and realistically, and analyze the essence of American interests in this country...with a view to India's leading position on the subcontinent," as well as the fact that the Zia-ul-Haq regime "is considered to be repressive and illegal by many Pakistanis."<sup>23</sup> Citing the views of influential circles, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT commented that the continued activation of U.S. relations with an "unpopular military regime" would not only endanger U.S. relations with a "future Pakistani government" but would also evoke the condemnation of countries "which are already criticizing the United States for its support of military dictatorships."<sup>24</sup> In addition, the White House felt that Pakistan, in view of the grave state of its economy, would soon experience a "change of heart."

In July 1980, however, the consortium for aid to Pakistan gave Islamabad an extension on the repayment of its latest debt with the consent of the United States. The decision to postpone the repayment of the debt, and even to cancel part of it, was extremely important to Pakistan because its payments and interest combined come to 700 million dollars a year.

Although Pakistan has temporarily refused American grants, it is still receiving large loans from several rich Moslem countries, especially Saudi Arabia.

Pakistani-Chinese contacts were noticeably activated in 1980. Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Islamabad at the end of January, a military delegation from the PRC, headed by Xiao Ke, administrator of the PLA Military-Political Academy, went to Pakistan in March, and in May President Zia-ul-Haq visited China.



It should be noted that although Washington is now encouraging Pakistani-Chinese convergence, many in the United States realize that the consolidation of China's influence in the South Asian countries will ultimately conflict with the desire of American ruling circles to strengthen their own influence in this region.

Pakistan's continued participation in the aggression against Afghanistan and subversive acts against India, its offer of special entry and maintenance privileges to American and other Western naval ships in Pakistani ports and its more active military cooperation with Beijing all testify that Pakistan is still an important link in the United States' aggressive policy in South Asia.

#### A Real Threat to the Security of the People in This Region

When the Carter Administration unilaterally broke off the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean in February 1978, it immediately began to augment U.S. military presence in this region. In a message to Congress, J. Carter acknowledged that the United States had not only considerably "increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean" but also intended to keep it on a high level in the future.<sup>25</sup>

The next milestones in the American policy of escalating tension in this region were the Pentagon's decision to enlarge the base on Diego Garcia, which is already a full-sized facility for the support of U.S. air and naval forces, and its decision to find locations for new bases; the creation of the "rapid deployment force";<sup>26</sup> the drafting of plans for the formation of a fifth U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean, with the Diego Garcia base as its center; the preparations for a new military bloc or blocs; the declaration of the U.S. right to undertake military intervention, and on the basis of the United States' own interpretation of the situation in the region in question.

This purposeful activity in Washington to build up American military presence in the region will nullify the South Asian countries' efforts to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Whereas the atmosphere in South Asia in the mid-1970's was one promoting the peaceful settlement of all debatable issues in the interrelations of the countries of the subcontinent, U.S. policy in South Asia had not only dissipated this atmosphere by the beginning of the 1980's but had also posed several new problems for the states of the subcontinent, particularly the problem of safeguarding regional security. The increasingly aggressive nature of American foreign policy strategy escalated tension in the international arena, including tension in regions bordering on South Asia, in Southeast Asia and in the Near and Middle East. All of this is increasing the probability of a crisis on the subcontinent and the danger of direct U.S. intervention in the affairs of the South Asian countries.

It was stressed at the International Conference on Peace and Security in Asia, held in New Delhi at the end of March this year, that the "existence of a secret agreement between the United States and China is undermining stability in Asia and constitutes a serious threat to peace on this continent and throughout the world."<sup>27</sup> In the Beijing leaders, American ruling circles have found their most energetic accomplices, serving as an anti-Soviet attack force and the main pillar supporting reaction and counterrevolution in Asia.

Now that Hindustan is becoming an arena of power plays instigated by Washington and Beijing, the countries of this region must deal with another problem--the national security of the South Asian countries. The Gandhi government recently announced, for example, that it was extremely worried that the cold war was approaching India's boundaries. The public and the press in India associate the energization of subversive forces in India's northeastern regions with the increased activity of American, Chinese and Pakistani special services and the closer coordination of their efforts.

The problem of the unlawful activity of some special services on the subcontinent became particularly acute when the press reported some new facts exposing the CIA's involvement in the conspiracy which led to the overthrow of the Mujibur Rahman government in 1975.

Many political figures in Pakistan are also preoccupied with the problem of national security. Involvement in Washington's aggressive plans and the expansion of military cooperation with the United States and Beijing are having a negative effect on Pakistan's relations with the Moslem countries, with neighboring states--India, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan--and with the movement for nonalignment.

Therefore, since the late 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's the United States has been moving toward an actively offensive strategy in South Asia. The goal is still the same: to direct developments in this region into a channel consistent with the "vital interests" of the United States as Washington sees them. As far as the methods of conducting policy are concerned, however, military-political aspects are becoming much more pronounced, American military presence in the Indian Ocean zone is being augmented, steps are being taken to regenerate the American-Pakistani military alliance, and efforts are being made to coordinate the policies of Washington and Beijing. The move away from the policy of "minimal presence" declared 4 years ago toward an aggressive strategy coincided with the general growth of aggressive tendencies in U.S. policy in the international arena and the more active U.S. attempts to establish military supremacy on the global scale.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. L. Rose, "The Superpowers in South Asia: a Geostrategic Analysis," ORBIS, No 2, 1978, pp 400-401
2. Quoted in: U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4 February 1980, p 75.
3. "The United States, India and South Asia: Interests, Trends and Issues for Congressional Concern," Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on International Relations, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Wash., 1978, pp 10, 11.
4. See, for example, L. Rose, Op. cit., pp 395, 399.
5. N. Palmer, "The Changing Scene in South Asia: Internal and External Dimensions," ORBIS, Fall 1975, p 903.

6. See, for example, "Southern Asia: The Politics of Poverty and Peace," edited by D. Hellmann, Lexington (Mass.), 1976, p 2.
7. "The United States, India and South Asia," pp 1-2.
8. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 26 February 1979, p 311.
9. In 1971 the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, which envisaged its demilitarization as well as its denuclearization--Editor's note.
10. BUSINESS AMERICA, 5 November 1979, p 25.
11. COMMERCE AMERICA, 19 December 1977, p 23.
12. STATESMAN, 30 January 1980.
13. TIME, 21 January 1980, p 35.
14. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 16 June 1980, p 43.
15. F. Frankel, "India's Promise," FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1980, p 36.
16. "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1980. Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives," Wash., 1979, p 369.
17. ASIAN SURVEY, November 1973, p 1046.
18. THE GUARDIAN, 13 March 1979.
19. FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1980, p 43.
20. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, Nos 5, 6, 1980--Editor's note.
21. THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 February 1980.
22. TIME, 28 January 1980, p 35.
23. FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1980, pp 38-39.
24. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 June 1980, p 31.
25. Quoted in: U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4 February 1980, p 75.
26. See A. V. Krutskikh, "An Instrument of U.S. Interventionism," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 9, 1980--Editor's note.
27. PRAVDA, 26 March 1980.



**RESULTS OF THE 1980 ELECTIONS**

**Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 47-51**

**[Article by V. O. Pechatnov]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

**CSO: 1803**

## THE WASHINGTON STRATEGIC SEESAW

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 52-59

[Article by G. A. Trofimenko]

[Text] A year and a half ago, Soviet and American leaders L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter signed the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT II) and a number of related documents in Vienna. The SALT II treaty stabilized the quantitative and qualitative parity between the USSR and the United States in the sphere of strategic arms and established preconditions for subsequent steps toward a considerable reduction of nuclear stockpiles and the institution of other measures in the sphere of military detente.

In the final communique on the Vienna meeting, each side declared that it "is not striving and will not strive in the future for military superiority because this could only lead to dangerous instability by giving rise to higher armament levels and would not promote the security of either side."

As far as the USSR was concerned, this statement expressed the essence of its principled approach to Soviet-American relations in the military sphere. This was reaffirmed by a joint decree of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers, which stressed that the Soviet Union is prepared to fully perform all of its commitments and believes that the other side will take the same approach to the matter.

However, the United States has not only failed to ratify the treaty to date, but has also begun to undermine it in the sphere of military construction and in the sphere of doctrine. The culminating point of this process was Directive No 59, which was signed by the American President on 25 July 1980 and announced a "new nuclear strategy."<sup>1</sup> Focusing on the reinforcement of the so-called counterforce potential of U.S. strategic arms, it has actually torpedoed the SALT process, and all of the new weapon systems that are being developed to serve as the material basis of the new strategy, particularly the planned method of deploying the mobile MX ICBM's, could make the effective verification of the limitations agreed upon by the two sides impossible--that is, they could undermine the fundamental principles of the SALT I and SALT II agreements.

In this way, although the United States is still verbally supporting the SALT process and is even favoring a move toward SALT III, it is taking the opposite tack in the sphere of arms construction. This suggests that Washington is trying

to use the very process of negotiation not to stabilize the strategic balance, but to camouflage its real intentions and to use the resulting "breathing-space" for material and conceptual preparations for abrupt steps in the direction of superiority. What is more, in view of the fact that Directive 59 repeats much of the notorious "Schlesinger doctrine" of 1974, which also emphasized counterforce, this indicates definite continuity in American military policy and the bipartisan, or, more precisely, the essentially supra-partisan, nature of U.S. military policy.

It is already absolutely clear that, despite the agreement signed with the USSR in 1972 on the first stage in the limitation of strategic arms (SALT I), the Republican Administration still continued to believe that the United States was militarily superior to the USSR to some degree due to the quality of American strategic arms, its powerful strategic aviation (unaffected by the SALT I agreement) and the existence of American forward-basing nuclear systems in Europe and Asia. American officials and the military establishment rarely use the word "parity," preferring to speak of "approximate parity," "rough parity," "considerable balance" and so forth.

In the belief that the United States held considerable advantages, Pentagon officials expected the United States to retain the possibility of inflicting more damage on the Soviet Union than the USSR could inflict on the United States even under the conditions of SALT I, particularly if it should have an opportunity to strike first at the Soviet strategic complex--that is, if it could deliver, in the language of American theoreticians, "a preventive counterforce strike," and thereby considerably weaken the retaliatory Soviet strike.

Whatever the considerations of American politicians and strategists were at the beginning of the 1970's, however, by the end of the decade they had to realize and officially acknowledge that the strategic weapons of the two sides were approaching equilibrium, not only in the quantitative sense but largely in the qualitative sense as well.

Moreover, as the United States now maintains, in the first half of the 1980's the Soviet Union could overtake the United States in terms of several qualitative parameters of strategic weapons. In other words, this would be a parity covering both the number of existing systems and actual combat capability. This new situation was recorded in the SALT II treaty, in accordance with which the United States agreed to establish equal ceilings with the USSR on the total number of ICBM delivery vehicles and to a broad variety of qualitative restrictions.

When the SALT II treaty was signed, American politicians certainly knew that it recorded the actual equality of the two countries in the area of strategic arms.

It is indicative that H. Kissinger, who had taken an active part in the SALT II negotiations when he was U.S. secretary of state, called the equilibrium recorded in SALT II a revolution in U.S.-Soviet strategic interrelations when he spoke in Brussels in September 1979 at an international conference on the future of NATO. "Our strategic doctrine," he said, "relied quite strongly and, possibly, even exclusively on our superior strategic strength. The Soviet Union has never relied on its superior strategic strength.... This is why even equal destructive power, even the possibility of 'guaranteed destruction' for both sides would seem to be a revolution in the strategic balance. We must face this fact."



Paradoxical as it may seem, when Kissinger decided to publicly call the situation of parity a revolution in the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance in 1979, he was essentially only repeating what another theoretician, P. Nitze,<sup>2</sup> had already said in 1977. At that time, Nitze wrote an article for FOREIGN POLICY magazine with the eloquent title "The Deterrence of Our Detering Factor." In essence, the article could be summed up in two sentences: It is extremely good when the United States deters the USSR. When the Soviet Union has an opportunity to deter the United States, however, this is not merely bad; it is disastrous.

The American "detering factor" served not to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States, but to establish a power basis for unrestrained military behavior by the United States in the world arena. The United States believed at that time that it did not have to give too much consideration to the interests of the "potential adversary" (this is what American strategists call the Soviet Union) because the Soviet Union would be the loser if any local conflict should escalate to a higher level or evolve into a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation.

The development of a Soviet strategic arsenal, comparable to the U.S. arsenal in terms of quality as well as quantity, however, radically changed the situation: The American nuclear detering factor would be deterred by the Soviet strategic nuclear factor regardless of the "scenario" of the onset and continuation of hostilities, American strength would be neutralized by the strength of the Soviet Union, and the tendency toward mutual deterrence--actual and not just verbal--would become dominant.

A multitude of theoretical articles and practical recommendations regarding the advantages of the situation of mutual deterrence have been published in the United States. It is this situation that has been praised and called extremely stable by all U.S. secretaries of defense in the last 20 years--from R. McNamara to H. Brown--whenever they have had to speak sincerely to the general public.

As it turned out, however, it was precisely the situation of mutual deterrence that did not please the United States and it was not only the U.S. generals that objected to it, but, apparently, many politicians as well. They object to it because the chief function of strategic forces in a situation of mutual deterrence based on strategic parity is the avoidance or prevention of war by means of the threatened punishment of the attacking side with a crippling retaliatory strike. American politicians and strategists, as the theoreticians of global war have frankly stated, do not want to prevent war, but to create opportunities for the actual use of armed forces (including strategic forces) in the attainment of U.S. foreign policy goals.

"American strategic forces," C. Gray and C. Payne frankly admitted, for example, in the summer 1980 issue of FOREIGN POLICY, "do not exist solely to deter a Soviet attack on the United States. In addition, they are intended to support U.S. foreign policy.... This function calls for the kind of strategic forces that would give the President an opportunity to initiate their use for purposes of constraint, even if these purposes should be politically defensive" (that is, we will, they imply, launch the first counterforce attack on the USSR, but we will call it "politically defensive"--G. T.). And just so that the reader does not have the slightest doubts about the "danger" of strategic parity, the authors use the simplest terms to explain that "a situation of parity or equality is

essentially /incompatible with our growing commitments in the sphere of deterrence due to the self-deterrence built into this kind of strategic context/" [in bold-face] (emphasis mine--G. T.).

Naturally, the use of strategic forces could be "initiated" by the President only if the United States was significantly superior to the "potential adversary," superior enough to give the White House the hope of delivering a disarming American strike that would make the retaliatory strike "acceptable"--that is, endurable. This is the basis of the strategic theory. Given the existing strategic balance, as Washington is well aware, the USSR will retain effective retaliatory potential even after it has been the target of a nuclear attack. For this reason, American strategic construction and strategic theory are aimed at depriving the USSR of the possibility of effective retaliation, or at least the arousal of doubts about the Soviet capability for effective retaliation. If this is accomplished, Washington believes that the United States will then have a free hand.

In the abovementioned article, P. Nitze quite precisely sets forth the minimum requirements of strategic construction, essential for guaranteed superiority. These are, firstly, the creation of powerful counterforce potential in strategic offensive weapons capable of inflicting considerable damage on the offensive and defensive means of the enemy; secondly, the organization of sufficiently reinforced dispersed, mobile or protected strategic offensive forces so that the enemy will be unable to effectively disarm them; thirdly, the creation of a viable, highly defended component of reserve strategic forces capable of launching, if the need should arise, an effective strike against the industrial and civilian centers of the other side after the initial exchange of nuclear strikes; fourthly, the institution of active and passive defensive measures; and, finally, fifthly, the maintenance of first strike potential under any circumstances.

If we analyze U.S. military construction and the presidential strategic directives that have been made public, the only possible conclusion is that the Carter Administration is scrupulously working toward these goals in all spheres. All of the strategic systems now being developed or deployed in the United States possess heightened counterforce potential within the context of accuracy, nuclear charge strength, tracking speed and so forth. These include the Trident-1 submarine missile system, the more precise, longer-range Trident-2 system now being developed, the strategic air-to-ground subsonic cruise missiles, which will be followed by a new generation of supersonic cruise missiles, the more powerful and more accurate new Mark-12A warheads for the Minuteman-3 ICBM and, finally, the mobile MX intercontinental missile with 10 highly accurate, independently targetable warheads. By creating a system of mobile ICBM's and a diversified system of shelters for them (around 5,000 silos), the Pentagon is actually striving to remove this part of U.S. strategic forces from the control of national technical means.

All of this represents classic--from the standpoint of theory--preparations for first strike potential. Verbally, it is true, the American leadership has denied any intention of this kind, alleging that its position is a defensive one and that the position of the USSR is--quite unjustifiably--offensive. This is being done to whitewash Washington in the eyes of American and world public opinion and to represent the United States as the non-aggressive side. In fact, however, it is virtually impossible to reconcile the position of counterforce--and this has even been admitted by American theoreticians--with the position of strategic defense. Counterforce presupposes the first strike, and this is also an axiom of nuclear strategy.

But the doctrinal position of the United States is not merely a desire to guarantee first (disarming) strike potential. The new American strategy is primarily intended to guarantee so-called escalating domination: to give the United States the ability to force its own opponent in a nuclear missile exchange to accept the U.S. "rules of exchange" (or, as the Americans put it, "rules of the game"). American strategists realize that the other side will always, even under the worst circumstances, be able to deliver a strike against the urban and industrial complex in the United States. This is why the American "proposal" to spare the cities and deliver strikes only against military facilities clothes an extremely pragmatic consideration with the external trappings of humanitarianism: This would force the other side to accept a form of nuclear "duel" in which the United States' partial advantages (in the form of some kind of qualitative advances) would become the deciding factor, giving the United States an opportunity to disarm the other side and take away its potential for effective deterrence. But who will follow these "rules" if they benefit only one side?<sup>3</sup> It is no wonder that even the American "hawks" who are urging the U.S. political leadership to adopt adventurous strategic lines cannot deny, in their lucid moments, that U.S. expectations "could be nullified by the Soviet Union's failure to use its strategic forces absolutely in the American manner."

Justifying Directive 59, the secretary of defense and other U.S. military and political leaders have implied that Washington is taking up the strategy of counterforce because the Soviet Union is also inclined to employ the counterforce tactic in the use of its strategic forces. In recent months, the American press has circulated the rumor that Soviet military publications are "filled" with appeals for "military victory," for "first strikes" and so forth, although neither the U.S. secretary of defense nor any American theoretician can cite a single statement by a Soviet military or civilian leader to corroborate the American insinuations for the simple reason that no statements of this kind exist.

The Soviet Union's actual stand in matters of military doctrine and strategy has nothing in common with the aggressive intentions ascribed to the USSR. This stand, which has been unequivocally and precisely set forth in speeches by L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the USSR Defense Council, D. F. Ustinov, marshal of the Soviet Union, Soviet minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and other Soviet leaders, can briefly be described as the following:

In the hands of the USSR, a nuclear missile is an exclusively defensive device, a device for the deterrence of a potential aggressor;

Only the most extraordinary circumstances--aggression against the USSR or its allies--could compel the USSR to resort to this extreme form of self-defense;

The Soviet Union does not only reject the concept of the first strike, but it also proposes that the states participating in the all-Europe conference on security and cooperation, including the United States, conclude an agreement on no first use of nuclear or conventional weapons against one another;

The USSR is not striving for superiority in weapons and is doing nothing beyond what is absolutely necessary to safeguard its security and the security of its allies;



The Soviet Union categorically objects to the preservation of peace by means of a "balance of terror." Genuinely lasting and strong stability must be based on a different foundation--namely, the eradication of mutual intimidation, suspicion and threats. This can be achieved by means of military detente, based on far-reaching measures in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. This is the purpose of all of the USSR's many proposals regarding military detente.

These are the basic principles on which the strategy of Soviet security is based.

From time to time, however, a semi-educated American "theoretician" finds the phrase "war is an extension of policy" in the works of Soviet authors and uses it as a basis to prove that the USSR's intentions are "aggressive" and that it is "striving" to attain communist objectives with the aid of war. The individuals who latch on to this kind of "proof" are just as ignorant about strategy and politics as those who take advantage of this kind of "theoretical frankness." The idea that war is an extension of policy by different means was first set forth by the renowned theoretician Clausewitz and was later developed and clarified by the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin. But the indisputable fact that war serves policy does not in any way signify that world war with the use of nuclear weapons is an acceptable or realistic instrument of policy. It is precisely because nuclear war cannot serve any sensible political goal, while the means of this kind of warfare--nuclear missiles--make the price of attaining any political goal not just too high, but prohibitive, that nuclear war is not a practical instrument of policy at the present time, and it can only be regarded as such in the realm of theory--it is an instrument of policy which cannot be used.

Speaking in Sofia in September 1980 at the World Parliament of People for Peace, the head of the Soviet delegation, B. N. Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, reemphasized that, "both in the quantitative and in the qualitative sense, weapons of human annihilation have reached a level at which the use of world war to attain political goals has become impossible."

If we consider, on the other hand, theoretical approaches to strategy, we must say that whereas the Marxist approach to this matter is absolutely definite and unequivocal, the theoretical views of the U.S. leaders on the question of the relationship between policy and war are extremely confused. At times, when we read their statements and analyze their practical decisions, we must assume that they regard policy as an extension of military strategy and of war. American foreign policy decisions lay too much emphasis on military means, and purely military considerations account for an excessive proportion of the decisions of the American National Security Council.

If we disregard the American leadership and concern ourselves with those who supply the powers that be with ideas, we could cite dozens, if not hundreds, of examples of overtly misanthropic reasoning by American experts and coldblooded calculations of the "megadeaths" and other injuries that could be inflicted on the Soviet Union by American strategic forces if "used correctly"--that is, used in accordance with the recommendations of the theoreticians.

Here, for example, is what Doctor C. Gray, Hudson Institution researcher, wrote about an American war against the Soviet Union in an article with the innocent-sounding, neutral title "The Problem of Taking Aim in a Central War," printed in

January-February 1980 in a journal published by the U.S. Naval Academy. One of the problems which disturbs this American author in connection with this type of war is the problem of the division of the Soviet Union into separate regions as a result of an American attack.

"The regionalization of the Soviet Union (or, we could say, its division or its Balkanization) has recently been the object of considerable research," he writes. One of the results of this research has been the conclusion that the accomplishment and maintenance of this kind of regionalization "would probably require the 'institution of order' primarily by U.S. forces and the performance of police functions on a truly grand scale (overseas involvement unprecedented in terms of scales and complexity)." When goals of this kind are being set, the American geopolitical expert wisely reasons, "it would be a big mistake to approach the problem of world war as if it were nothing more than a central war between the so-called strategic forces. Actually, the more promising ideas about the prevention of a Soviet victory or the defeat of the USSR will require ingenious offensive operations by the conventional armed forces of the West, and not simply the skillful aiming of strategic nuclear warheads." He then goes on for some time in the same vein.

It should be stressed that this kind of "theoretical discussion" is not being printed in the gutter press, but in absolutely respectable academic journals.

No matter how hard the American civilian and military leaders try to frighten the Soviet Union with their "well-orchestrated" strategy of counterforce superiority, the United States does not possess this kind of superiority because the majority of the systems on which Directive 59 relies will not be ready for use until the second half of the 1980's. In keeping with the White House custom, however, as soon as the American leaders dream up something, they hastily turn their as yet nonexistent, future possibilities into a psychological threat to be leveled at the other side and try to gain political and diplomatic advantages from this. It would be naive, however, to expect the other side to sit idly by, waiting for the United States to acquire superior counterforce.

As the Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed, the USSR will not tolerate any kind of military superiority on the other side. Naturally, it will not change its strategy simply because someone in Washington has tried to perpetrate another bluff by making yet another directive public--particularly in view of the fact that the political and military leaders of the United States already publish excessive amounts of various types of "strategies," "doctrines," memoranda and directives each quarter.

It is not that Carter's latest belligerent announcement has increased the threat to Soviet security. The Soviet Union's concern about its defense is not based on the content of various announcements, but on actual tendencies in U.S. military policy and military construction, and these are sufficiently apparent without any kind of announcements. No one should have any doubt that the USSR will take all necessary steps to safeguard its security and the security of its allies.

Something else is more disturbing, and that is the fact that the U.S. President might begin to publicly rattle the saber, including the nuclear saber, purely for his own campaign purposes, and that nuclear strategy, which must be approached with extreme caution given the gigantic stockpiles of nuclear explosives accumulated by

the two sides, might serve political campaign tactics in the United States. It is also disturbing that the Washington administration has assessed all of its foreign policy "moves" in the last 4 years with a view to military possibilities rather than diplomatic potential.

This kind of feverish militaristic activity in the United States, accompanied by new rounds in the arms race, has been witnessed in the past as well. But it has not given the United States military superiority, the USSR has not lagged behind the United States in the military sphere, and Soviet-American military parity is now a mutually acknowledged fact.

But should this rivalry take a direction in which political competition is replaced by outright military confrontation? Would it not be better--and safer--to work toward the political settlement of disputes and toward cooperation in the prevention of a global nuclear catastrophe--that is, would it not be better to take the path chosen by the two countries in the beginning of the 1970's?

The Soviet side has once again authoritatively declared that the USSR has not sought, and is not seeking, any kind of onesided advantages in its relationship with the United States and is not striving for military superiority. It advocates the development of mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States for the preservation of peace.

As for the United States, the concrete foreign policy line of the new administration must still be worked out. It is indicative, however, that the two main presidential candidates in the last campaign began the race by trying to outdo one another in foreign policy belligerence and ended by dissociating themselves from this belligerence and stating that they were more steady and more objective than their opponents. This was an adaptation to the mood of the voting public, a recognition of the fact that the Americans are not eager to flex their military muscles and to rattle the saber, but they do want a foreign policy aimed at the consolidation of peace. In connection with this, we would like to hope that the new Republican Administration in the United States will display a constructive approach to questions of U.S.-Soviet relations, including the SALT issue.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. For more about Directive 59, see B. D. Pyadyshev, "Military Detente: Two Approaches"; A. G. Arbatov, "Strategic Parity and the Policy of the Carter Administration" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1980)--Editor's note.
2. This is the same P. Nitze who compiled a document (NSC-68) in the 1950's for the Truman Administration which envisaged the strategic nuclear bombing of the Soviet Union--from a position of American "absolute superiority."
3. It would also be wise to ask how the United States plans to conduct a precise counterforce strategic nuclear war, envisaging demonstrative and selective strikes against "target points," if the U.S. military leadership cannot coordinate an operation involving eight helicopters in the Iranian desert. Is the Pentagon not guilty of exaggerating its own capabilities and simultaneously denigrating the capabilities of the "potential adversary"?



**AMERICAN AID TO THE SADAT REGIME**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 60-70**

**[Article by A. I. Izyumov]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

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**THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 'SOVIET THREAT': DOMESTIC SOURCES OF THE COLD WAR  
CONSENSUS**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 71-78**

**[Second installment of abridgement by V. I. Bogachev of the book "The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus" by Alan Wolfe, Arms Control Association, Washington, 1980]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

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**PROTECTION OF ARABLE LAND**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 79-88**

**[Article by I. G. Vasil'yeva]**

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**THE MONOPOLIES AND THE UNIVERSITIES**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 89-95**

**[Article by A. O. Monfor]**

**[Not translated by JPRS]**

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## **BOOK REVIEWS**

### **America in the Coming Decade**

Moscow SSHA: **EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 96-100

[Review by V. S. Guseva of the book "The United States in the 1980's," edited by P. Duignan and A. Rabushka, Stanford (California), Hoover Institution Press, 1980, XXXIX + 858 pages + Index]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### **Review of Alternative Development Plans**

Moscow SSHA: **EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 100-103

[Review by V. S. Yezhov of the book "North-South: A Programme for Survival," The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues Under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, London and Sydney, Pan Books, 1980, 304 pages; and "To Choose a Future. Resource and Environmental Consequences of Alternative Growth Paths" by R. Ridker and W. Watson, Baltimore and London, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, XV + 463 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### **Secret Negotiations**

Moscow SSHA: **EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 103-104

[Review by G. T. Malyutin of the book "Operation Sunrise. The Secret Surrender" by B. Smith and E. Agarossi, New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979, 234 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### **International Security and Nuclear Weapons**

Moscow SSHA: **EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA** in Russian No 12, Dec 80 p 104

[Review by V. F. Petrov of the book "Mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost' i yadernoye oruzhiye" by A. A. Roshchin, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1980, 287 pages]

[Text] The author of this book is an experienced specialist. He has been studying the topic of disarmament for more than three decades. Between 1966 and 1976

A. A. Roshchin represented the Soviet Union in the Disarmament Commission. In this book, the author has reproduced the tense atmosphere of international talks on several key aspects of disarmament--the nuclear test ban, the drafting of the non-proliferation treaty and the SALT agreements.

On the basis of abundant factual material, A. A. Roshchin demonstrates two fundamentally different approaches to nuclear weapons--the approach of the United States and the capitalist countries on one side and the approach of the USSR and the socialist countries on the other. Whereas the United States has regarded nuclear weapons as an instrument of foreign policy since the very beginning of the "atomic age" and has done everything within its power to first retain its monopoly and then gain leadership in the race for nuclear arms, the USSR has tirelessly worked toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons once and for all.

International security can only be consolidated by means of international detente and disarmament. The race for nuclear arms must be limited, stopped and reversed--these are the main conclusions of this timely study by a Soviet diplomat.

#### Torpedo Boats Cross the Ocean

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 104-105

[Review by B. D. Yashin of the book "Katera peresekayut okean" by B. V. Nikitin, Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1980, 224 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

#### Doctrine of National Security in U.S. Global Strategy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 105-106

[Review by A. A. Kokoshin of the book "Doktrina 'natsional'noy bezopasnosti' v global'noy strategii SShA" by V. F. Petrovskiy, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1980, 336 pages]

[Text] In this study, V. F. Petrovskiy skillfully combines a critical analysis of bourgeois theories of international relations, foreign policy concepts and the official foreign policy aims set forth by U.S. government leaders with an examination of the foreign policy mechanism, the main element of which is the so-called "national security system."

A prominent place has been assigned to a study of the role of military strength as the chief instrument of American policy on "national security" and the particular ways in which the United States is now using military strength for political purposes. The author discusses attempts to adapt the use of pure military strength in foreign policy to the new strategic situation in today's world, distinguished by an approximate parity of strength between the USSR and the United States. The author presents a conceptual assessment of the role of military strength in present U.S. foreign policy strategy (pp 128-129).

In addition, the author notes that research projects are now being conducted in a number of American research centers with the aim of putting an end to this strategic

parity. The demand for military superiority to the Soviet Union is once again being voiced in speeches by U.S. politicians.

Contemporary bourgeois theoreticians attach great significance to the differentiated assessment of the possibilities of various branches of the armed forces as instruments of foreign policy. From this standpoint, the author's analysis of the role of the U.S. Navy, evolving over many decades of American history, tradition and the patterns of imperialist "gunboat diplomacy" and adapted to present conditions, is particularly interesting. It is apparent that U.S. ruling circles, particularly military leaders, are least willing to accept the present Soviet-American naval balance. They try to justify this by citing the differences in the geographic and international economic positions of the two powers and the United States' tremendous dependence on shipping for much of its supplies of petroleum and other major raw materials.

In his multileveled study of the policy and doctrine of "national security," V. F. Petrovskiy presents interesting statistics and information about the struggle over this matter in the United States, which is continuing despite the general shift to the right in domestic politics. Many bourgeois scholars and politicians object to the interpretation of "national security" primarily in terms of strength, and believe that it should be guaranteed not by means of a new buildup of military strength but by means of lower levels of military confrontation and the establishment of an entire network of means for the preservation of international peace and security.

Petrovskiy is one of the first Soviet scholars to analyze the workings of the U.S. foreign policy mechanism under the Carter Administration. He provides us with more information about the way in which this administration, pressured by rightist forces, gradually departed from the policy of detente and agreed to the restriction of negotiations and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Subjecting the militaristic components of U.S. foreign policy to thorough and comprehensive criticism, the author simultaneously points out conditions and possibilities for an alternative, more realistic U.S. policy in the international arena. He contrasts Washington's line of escalating international tension with the consistently peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and the new Soviet initiatives aimed at the development of detente.

#### The Tuesday Happenings

Moscow SSNA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 p 106

[Review by V. A. Voyna of the book "Heppening po vtornikan" by Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1979, 108 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## ORGANIZATIONS OF THE 'NEW CHINA LOBBY'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 80 pp 107-113

[Article by A. A. Nagornyy and Ye. P. Bazhanov]

[Text] American policy toward Beijing has undergone fundamental changes in the last decade. At the end of the 1960's the United States still regarded the PRC as an enemy, but now representatives of the U.S. ruling class call China America's "partner" in politics, economics and other spheres.

The evolution of U.S. views in regard to the PRC has been a complex and contradictory process. The revision of the traditional policy of non-recognition and isolation of the PRC was first advocated by a small group of liberals, but representatives of the most diverse groups and segments of American society gradually joined the supporters of better relations with China. These forces, which are actively promoting the reconstruction of the U.S. approach to the PRC and the elaboration of a new American policy of convergence with Beijing, are called the "new China lobby" in American sociopolitical literature and the press.<sup>1</sup>

The "new China lobby," so designated to distinguish it from the pro-Taiwan "China lobby" that was extremely influential in American domestic politics throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's,<sup>2</sup> is not a single entity in the ideological, political or organizational respects. Rightist, reactionary elements, viewing convergence with Beijing through the prism of anti-Sovietism, are acquiring increasing influence within this lobby, but many of those who advocate the improvement of American-Chinese relations are sober-minded individuals who realize that U.S. contacts with China should not harm Soviet-American relations, which are of decisive importance to the cause of world peace. Many Americans (members of the intelligentsia and labor unions, white-collar workers and so forth) are taking part in the development of contacts with the PRC in the interest of professional or cultural considerations, and not for political reasons. On the whole, the "new China lobby" is a fairly integral term, uniting various forces and groups in American society in a single category solely on the basis of a single feature--their active involvement in the development of American-Chinese relations--regardless of their motives and aims.

An analysis of the forces making up this lobby, their interaction in some matters and the fighting between various factions in other matters, and the evolution of the "new China lobby" constitute a large and interesting subject deserving separate examination. This article will only be concerned with the activities of the more

important organizations set up by the advocates of better relations between the United States and the PRC and comprising the medium by which the views and opinions of the forces making up the "new China lobby" are either conveyed to the White House, where they influence Washington's China policy, or are employed to color American public opinion regarding China.

A central place among the organizations of the "new China lobby" is occupied by four nationwide associations--the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCR), the National Council for U.S.-China Trade (NCUSCT), the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC) and the U.S.-China Peoples' Friendship Association (USCPFA)--each of which represents a rallying point for smaller and less influential "related" organizations. The NCUSCR, CSCPRC and NCUSCT are closely connected with Washington and unite representatives of the U.S. ruling class with an active interest, for various reasons, in contacts with Beijing. The USCPFA is the most sizeable of the national organizations of the "new China lobby" unconnected with the U.S. ruling elite. It is supported primarily by the liberal-radical public. Even this organization, however, has recently tended to act in concert with the authorities.

The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was founded in 1966 through the combined efforts of the particular segments of business, scientific and journalistic circles, the administration and the U.S. Congress which were the first to realize the need to revise Washington's policy on the Chinese question with a view to the nationalistic tendencies of the PRC's Maoist leadership. The committee initiated hundreds of conferences and seminars and headed the compilation and distribution of the studies and journalistic articles which played an important role in the development of debates regarding U.S.-China relations, during the course of which a new approach to the PRC was worked out in the United States.

After the American-Chinese dialog began in 1971, the NCUSCR became a semiofficial organization, financed largely by federal budget funds<sup>3</sup> and headed by representatives of government circles.<sup>4</sup> The committee established broader contacts with monopolistic capital and was joined by major corporations, some of which became large contributors (Ford Motor, Exxon, Manufacturers Hanover Trust and others). The NCUSCR was also joined by a new large group of politicians, public spokesmen, journalists, scholars, church representatives and others.

In view of the absence of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing at that time, by the mutual consent of the two sides the committee became "the most important channel of U.S.-Chinese exchange in the spheres of education and culture."<sup>5</sup> In 1972 the NCUSCR began to organize visits to the PRC by American delegations and hosted groups arriving from the PRC.<sup>6</sup>

The NCUSCR still plays an important role in the sphere of exchanges with Beijing, but the scales of its activity on the whole had been reduced by the mid-1970's. As American-Chinese contacts grew broader and deeper, specialization took place within the "new China lobby" and many of the functions previously performed by the NCUSCR were reassigned to other organizations (including new ones) that were capable of dealing with various issues more effectively and efficiently than this committee.

For example, the study of China in American academic institutions and propaganda in favor of Beijing became the province of the China Council of the Asian Society, which has given universities, schools and public organizations displaying an interest in the PRC a great deal of organizational and, in particular, financial support.

In this respect, the activities of California's BAYCEP organization are typical.<sup>7</sup> It was established with funds received from the NCUSCR and was subsequently financed by the abovementioned Asian Society, although it is essentially an independent organization, headed and directed by a group of young Orientologists and secondary school teachers. The official goal of BAYCEP is to unite the efforts and resources of scholars and educators for the purpose of "promoting the use of materials pertaining to China in elementary and secondary schools" and "improving the methods and quality of instruction on China at the secondary school level."<sup>8</sup>

One of the concrete results of BAYCEP activities is the sharp increase of interest in China among the students of this area, including interest in the Chinese language, history and so forth, and the wave of teachers joint various nationwide organizations of the "new China lobby." The BAYCEP activists have not limited themselves, however, to the attainment of the organization's original objectives and are striving to involve as many people as possible in their work (essentially, propaganda in favor of Beijing). In 1974, they set up a permanent seminar for representatives of the elite in this part of the country, so as to include them (as Stanford University Professor B. Lee, the initiator of the program, stated in a letter) among the activists involved in the process of U.S.-China rapprochement.

The National Council for U.S.-China Trade (NCUSCT) was established in May 1973 in accordance with an agreement between Washington and Beijing to perform the functions of a middleman between American monopolies and the Chinese market. From the very beginning, the council was thought of as a private organization which would not be under the direct jurisdiction of the government, and it could therefore have views differing to some degree from Washington's on questions of American-Chinese relations.

The commotion aroused in the United States in the early 1970's over American-Chinese trade, the fact that the majority of American monopolies lacked even an elementary knowledge of China, and the refusal of the Chinese side to conduct trade with the United States through official channels until such time as bilateral relations had been completely normalized all contributed to the American business community's interest in the NCUSCT. The new organization was joined by 140 large and medium-sized companies, many of which belonged to NCUSCR as well, and it was headed by C. Phillips, a high-level federal official with ambassadorial status.<sup>9</sup>

The impressive membership of the NCUSCT immediately gave it a leading place among the organizations of the "new China lobby." The council made a great effort to establish and develop contacts between various American companies and Chinese foreign trade organizations and engaged in extensive studies of the Chinese market, but a particularly important element of the council's work, in the opinion of those who were urging U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, was its activity to mobilize the business community for the exertion of pressure on the White House and Congress in the Chinese question.

Stimulating the interest of American monopolies in the Chinese market by means of talk about the tremendous potential of American-Chinese trade and the presence of "virtually unlimited" petroleum reserves in the PRC,<sup>10</sup> the NCUSCT also suggested to businessmen that economic ties between the United States and China would develop normally only on the condition that diplomatic relations would be established between the two countries and that the PRC would be granted most-favored-nation



status in trade.<sup>11</sup> A lack of progress in these matters and in the settlement of the Taiwan issue, the American business community was warned by NCUSCT administrator C. Phillips (his numerous statements were widely quoted by the news media), would harm not only the commercial interests of the United States but also the entire complex of interrelations between the two countries.<sup>12</sup>

It should be noted that the NCUSCT was not simply stirring up interest in the business community in regard to the Chinese market, but was also pandering to Beijing by attempting to neutralize the interest of the U.S. business community in trade with the USSR. At various propagandistic business gatherings organized by the NCUSCT, representatives of the council spread slanderous rumors about the "unreliability" of Soviet foreign trade associations, the "disadvantages" of doing business with the USSR and the consequent need to separate the question of the granting of most-favored-nation status to the PRC from the question of the legal status of Soviet-American trade. The council pressured the Congress in the same way.<sup>13</sup>

The council also "pushed" for Chinese access to American technology, petitioning the authorities on behalf of the aerospace and electronic corporations which could not export their products to the PRC due to existing restrictions on the trade in strategic goods. In essence, the arguments put forth by the heads of the NCUSCT implied that China was not only "not hostile," but, on the contrary, was a friendly state, and that the development of close commercial ties with the PRC would be in the economic and political interest of the United States.<sup>14</sup> The council informed Washington of the need to give China tangible proof of its willingness to jointly "oppose" the Soviet Union, as Beijing would otherwise become "disillusioned" with the United States and would have to consent to a "reconciliation" with the USSR.<sup>15</sup>

For all these years, the NCUSCT also engaged in frank apologies for the domestic policy of the Beijing leaders. This sometimes went so far that representatives of the council criticized certain American businessmen for their "tactless treatment" of the PRC and "unfriendly attacks" on this country, referring to their criticizing remarks about the PRC, their arguments with Beijing's stand on the Taiwan issue, and so forth.<sup>16</sup>

After the normalization of American-Chinese relations, the council's lobbying activity in favor of China became even more active, although its content and purpose naturally underwent changes. Attention was focused on the quickest possible resolution of the problem of U.S. Export-Import Bank financing for American-Chinese trade, the establishment of transport, banking and exhibit contacts between the two countries, and the involvement of as many American companies as possible in economic ties with China.

Despite the fact that many American companies, including the largest monopolies (Boeing, RCA, Kaiser, Exxon, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank and others), have now established strong ties with the PRC, have gained experience in dealing with Beijing and would seem to have no need for middlemen,<sup>17</sup> even these companies are widely enlisting the services of the NCUSCT. The council not only knows the Chinese market and not only has close working contacts with Beijing representatives, but is also regarded by business as its own collective representative in relations between the business community in the United States and China. The ranks of the NCUSCT are still growing and the council now has more than 400 collective members. Many local



organizations, representing business circles in different parts of the United States, are now working toward the same end in close contact with the NCUSCT.

In the area of American-Chinese economic contacts, the most active of these organizations is the Chamber of Commerce of Greater San Francisco, a region with a long-standing tradition of trade with the Asian countries. The chamber has a committee on American-Chinese trade which regularly sends economic delegations to the PRC, hosts many visitors from China (it is the sponsor of Chinese graduate students and scientific workers covered by exchange programs in Northern California universities), conducts conferences and other gatherings to discuss American-Chinese economic exchange, subsidizes programs for the study of the PRC in academic institutions and analyzes the state of the Chinese markets, distributing the results of its research to a large group of companies.

The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC) was founded in 1966, also with the approval of the federal government and with the participation of the most influential scientific organizations closely connected with U.S. ruling circles--the National Academy of Sciences, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. Having the goal of familiarizing American scholars with the development of Chinese science, the committee immediately became, in essence, one of the lobbying centers stimulating American scientific interest in the PRC (by organizing permanent seminars on various fields of science in China and encouraging scientists to seek unofficial contacts with their Chinese colleagues).<sup>18</sup> In 1969 the committee began to publicly advocate the normalization of relations between the governments of the United States and PRC.<sup>19</sup>

When the American-Chinese dialog began, the committee, with the support of the White House, actually monopolized the sphere of scientific contacts with the PRC. Between 1973 and 1978 the committee sent 35 delegations to China and hosted 43 groups of Chinese scientists.<sup>20</sup> In 1979, after diplomatic relations had been established between Washington and Beijing, scientific contacts with the PRC through CSCPRC channels (just as all contacts in general) were augmented even more.<sup>21</sup>

The committee has simultaneously continued its research work, collecting and summarizing data on Chinese science, determining the scientific fields of the greatest potential interest to American scientists, and focusing the attention of specialists in these fields. In this way, the CSCPRC represents the particular forces in the American scientific community which have displayed an interest in contacts with China, and it also serves as a channel of influence on the scientific community, which was once passive about American-Chinese exchanges, and, incidentally, on other segments of American society. Naturally, the committee is more than a lobbying organization; it is actively used by the authorities for the collection of information about Chinese science.<sup>22</sup>

Certain universities and scientific centers have also engaged in scientific contacts with the PRC. Stanford and Columbia universities have gone the furthest in this direction by establishing special organizations for U.S.-Chinese relations and signing agreements with the Chinese authorities which envisage the exchange of delegations of scientists, trainees, lecturers, research materials and so forth.<sup>23</sup>

The U.S.-China Peoples' Friendship Association (USCPFA) began to take shape at the very beginning of the 1970's: The first local branches, uniting persons favoring "friendship with the Chinese people," were founded in summer 1971 (soon after the "ping-pong" diplomacy started by Beijing) in New York and San Francisco. In 1974 the first national constituent congress of the association was held in Los Angeles and was attended by 350 delegates from 36 cities. Most of the congress delegates were Maoists, and the rest included renegades from the American communist movement, members of the liberal intelligentsia, secondary school teachers and religious missionaries.<sup>24</sup> The congress registered 38 local branches of the association with a total membership of approximately 700. By the time of the fifth congress (in September 1978), the organization already had 99 branches and 27 organizational committees (branches with less than 10 members) and the total membership exceeded 9,000.<sup>25</sup>

The USCPFA has skillfully employed the American public's interest in China, aroused by the commencement of a dialog with Beijing after long years of isolation and heightened by the related commotion in U.S. ruling circles. It is also significant that the USCPFA has received strong financial support from Beijing. The association receives much of its income in the form of commissions paid to it by the PRC Tourist Agency for the special tour groups sent to China. In 1978 its net income from tourist operations amounted to 430,000 dollars (with a total income of 451,000).<sup>26</sup>

After the normalization of American-Chinese relations, the scales of USCPFA activity expanded. In 1979 the USCPFA sent 3,800 Americans to China, and before the end of 1980 it will send, by agreement with the Chinese authorities, 86 delegations to the PRC, made up of more than 4,000 individuals (for a total of 9,000 since 1972). A special effort will be made to ensure that these delegations, and later the membership rolls of the association, include representatives of the particular social strata that have remained uninvolved in USCPFA activity to date, but are regarded by the heads of this association and by Beijing as extremely important groups deserving special attention--union members, rank and file workers and members of ethnic minorities (particularly Chinese, but also Afro-Americans and Chicanos).<sup>27</sup>

The association has recently made a considerable effort to establish cooperative ties with the elite of American society. The USCPFA is now being included more frequently in undertakings by the State Department, local government and the business community in connection with American-Chinese relations (the welcoming of guests from the PRC, conferences on the Chinese question and so forth). The association's goal is self-evident: to acquire respectability in the eyes of ruling circles and gain an opportunity to influence the American public by means of propaganda and influence Washington's policy toward Beijing. The USCPFA is already able to involve many prestigious organizations in its own undertakings, including the lobbying associations with government connections discussed above, as well as prominent liberal legislators (for example, Senator A. Cranston and Congressmen L. AuCoin and P. Findley), famous Hollywood movie stars and directors (S. MacLaine, N. Lear, M. T. Moore and S. Allen) and renowned Orientologists (B. Lee, G. Harding, J. Cohen and J. Service).

The USCPFA employs the channels to which it has access for the conduct of spiteful anti-Soviet propaganda, repeating Beijing's slanderous statements about the Soviet

Union. In its assessment of American-Chinese normalization and its consequences, this association has joined rightist conservative circles in the United States in welcoming Washington's rapprochement with Beijing as a move in line with American strategic interests.

This political platform, however, is not approved by all members of the USCPFA. The association is far from homogeneous in its composition, and the growth of its membership will intensify this heterogeneity and will affect the political focus of the USCPFA. Internal disagreements recently broke out in the association, for example, between its pro-Beijing administrators, who are prepared to blindly go along with all of the zigzags and changes in Beijing's strategy and tactics, and Maoists from ultra-leftist sectarian groups, who have called for the condemnation of the policy of the present Chinese leadership as a revisionist line contradicting the ideas of Mao Zedong.<sup>28</sup> Some of the Maoists were expelled from the organization but this did not restore its unity. The ultra-leftist elements remaining in the USCPFA are encouraging the association to engage in anti-Beijing actions; at the same time, representatives of the liberal and moderate intelligentsia, who now constitute an increasingly high percentage of the membership of many USCPFA branches, are urging the association leadership to behave more independently of Beijing.

The USCPFA is associated with a large group of other organizations which are completely independent but are working toward the same end and in close coordination with the association. A particularly significant place among these is occupied by bookdealers specializing in the distribution of Chinese propaganda literature in the United States. One of the main ones is China Books and Periodicals, founded by a renegade from the progressive movement of the 1950's in the United States, G. Noyes, in Chicago, and now managed from San Francisco by his son, K. Noyes. China Books and Periodicals regularly purchases a broad assortment of books, brochures and magazines pertaining to all branches of politics, economics and culture in the PRC and ships them to more than 2,000 bookstores and 3,000 libraries in the United States, as well as tens of thousands of individual clients.<sup>29</sup> The firm also distributes all of the propaganda materials of the USCPFA and other lobbying organizations and all of the pro-Beijing periodicals published in the United States, and takes part in all political and cultural gatherings where customers for Maoist literature might be found. In conjunction with the USCPFA, it organizes receptions for delegations from the PRC. The firm's trade volume is increasing at a rate of 15-20 percent a year.

In the second half of the 1960's and in the 1970's, other organizations of the intelligentsia, religious spokesmen and students with liberal, leftist-liberal and radical Maoist convictions were also functioning in the United States, advocating the revision of Washington's policy line in Asia and the normalization of relations with Beijing: Citizens for a Change in Policy Toward China, American Friends Service Committee, Committee of Clergymen on Chinese Affairs, Committee for a New China Policy, Students for a Better Understanding of China and others. Some of these groups still exist, others were disbanded at some point, and still others became part of various lobbyist organizations. All of them, despite their small membership, made a definite contribution to the modification of public opinion regarding the PRC, particularly among university and high school students. One of the chief media of their influence on the American public was the publication of bulletins, magazines, brochures and other propaganda like the fairly widespread bulletin "For a Better Understanding of China."



#### FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, R. Howe and S. Trott, "The Power Peddlers. How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Policy," New York, 1977; A. Kubek, "The Red China Papers," New Rochelle, N.Y., 1975; B. Martin, "The New Old China Hands: Reshaping American Opinion," ASIAN AFFAIRS, January-February 1975.
2. For a discussion of the pro-Taiwan "China lobby," see, in particular, R. Koen, "The China Lobby in American Politics," N.Y., 1974; J. Thomas, "The Institute of Pacific Relations, Asian Scholars and American Politics," Seattle, 1974.
3. By 1975 the State Department was covering up to 50 percent of all NCUSCR expenditures.
4. In 1972 C. Yost, former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, was elected president of NCUSCR. That same year M. Blumenthal, who later became the U.S. secretary of the treasury, was the chairman of the committee board of directors.
5. See the letter from Chairman C. Yost of the NCUSCR board of director to the committee members of 27 May 1975.
6. In all, more than 50 exchanges of groups and delegations between the United States and the PRC were arranged through NCUSCR channels between 1972 and 1979.
7. This is an acronym for the "Bay Area China Education Project" (many academic institutions, including Stanford University, are concentrated in California's Bay Area).
8. See "National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Annual Report," 1 October 1974, 30 September 1973, pp 1-2, 11-13; "Bay Area China Education Project (BAYCEP)," Stanford (California), 1976.
9. The board of directors of this organization included prominent representatives of the American business community--Chairman of the Board of the Bendix Corporation, future Secretary of the Treasury M. Blumenthal, head of the Boeing aerospace corporation T. Wilson, head of Chase Manhattan Bank D. Rockefeller, Bank of America President O. Clausen and others.
10. See, for example, the article by the editor of the NCUSCT magazine U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW: N. Lublow, "China's Oil," U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, January-February 1974, pp 21-27, and the papers of the conference on Chinese oil organized by the council in Houston on 23 June 1976.
11. See the statement by C. Phillips in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 3 September 1976; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 August 1976; THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, September-October 1978, p 27.
12. See the statement by C. Phillips in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 January 1978.
13. It should be noted that representatives of the NCUSCT have been invited several times to sessions of various congressional committees and, in general, serve



many American legislators as an important source of information about China (R. Howe and S. Trott, Op. cit., pp 268-270).

14. This was discussed, in particular, at a conference of the council in Denver (Colorado) on 22-23 March 1977, where the production of mining and construction equipment in the PRC and the possibility of exporting this equipment from the United States to China were analyzed.
15. See the statement by C. Phillips in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 June 1978.
16. The NCUSCT's pro-Beijing line has been protested several times by business circles, and during the period of stagnation in American-Chinese relations in 1974-1976, when the attempts of American companies to penetrate the Chinese market produced no tangible results, many firms, particularly small ones, withdrew from the NCUSCT, thereby expressing their dissatisfaction with the organization's "misinformation."
17. The following data are indicative in this respect. In 1978 the United States and China exchanged 54 economic delegations, only 18 of which were set up directly by the NCUSCT. All of the rest were organized by individual firms (THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, November-December 1978, p 8).
18. "Summary of the Activities of the Committee on Scholarly Communications with Mainland China," Wash., 1968, pp 4, 7-8.
19. Ibid.
20. CHINA EXCHANGE NEWSLETTER, December 1979.
21. In particular, joint American-Chinese scientific symposiums were held for the first time (on pharmacology in the United States and on polymer chemicals in China), and a program was implemented for the exchange of scientific lecturers (30 Americans went to the PRC and 10 Chinese came to the United States to present lectures in various Chinese and U.S. scientific centers and universities for 1-3 months) and scientific trainees (15 from each side), and so forth. In addition, at the request of the American Government, the CSCPRC headed the implementation of exchange programs for students and scientific workers, which had been agreed upon by the governments of both countries in October 1978 ("Announcement. Fellowships for Study in the PRC," The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, Wash., 17 October 1978; CHINA EXCHANGE NEWSLETTER, February 1979, p 5).
22. People in the United States apparently believe that contacts with representatives of the Chinese scientific community will promote a favorable approach to the West in Chinese scientific circles and will aid in establishing the necessary conditions for sociopolitical changes in Chinese society.
23. CHINA EXCHANGE NEWSLETTER, December 1978, p 5.
24. U.S.-CHINA PEOPLES' FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER, September-October 1974.

25. "Convention 78. U.S.-China Peoples' Friendship Association," Membership Report for National Convention, San Francisco, 1979.
26. Ibid., pp 23-26.
27. U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, March-April 1979, pp 1, 8; May-June 1979, p 7.
28. See, for example, "An Open Letter from the Steering Committee of the Denver USCPFA to Locals and Members. From the Masses to the Masses," Denver (Colorado), 30 August 1978.
29. "Fifth Annual Convention 1978. U.S.-China Friendship Association," San Francisco, 1-4 September 1978. In recent years, this firm has sold, in particular, more than a million copies of the works of Mao Zedong (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 28 August 1977).

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CSO: 1803

**UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES**

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**[Article by V. B. Supyan]**

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